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1. INTRODUCTION 
Public corruption is the development issue of the twenty-first 
century. A broad consensus has emerged in recent years that 
corruption retards development by slowing economic growth, 
weakening government institutions, and exacerbating poverty.  
Uprooting the systemic, entrenched government corruption that 
plagues so many developing countries requires a long-term, multi-
faceted strategy, but a wide range of players on the international 
stage agree that effective criminal prosecution—jailing the bad 
guys—must be a cornerstone of the global anti-corruption 
campaign.  Convictions of corrupt officials not only disrupt corrupt 
networks, but also shake up the environment in which corruption 
is allowed to flourish, and increase deterrence by “making it clear 
to public officials that if they engage in corrupt conduct they will 
lose their offices, forfeit illegally acquired wealth, and go to 
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prison.”1  Investigations and prosecutions which yield quick and 
tangible results, resulting in attention-grabbing headlines and the 
potential for deterrence and galvanizing public will, can have a 
broad and immediate impact on society that no administrative 
reform plan can match. While broad structural measures 
addressing the root causes of corruption must be the core of 
sustainable reform, the day-to-day presence and pressure of 
credible, effective criminal law enforcement is what stimulates and 
sustains the momentum of an anti-corruption campaign.2  Or at 
least that is the ideal. To act as the catalyst that it is supposed to, 
however, law enforcement must be equipped to succeed. 
In all countries, public corruption is more difficult than most 
other illegal acts to investigate and prosecute.  It is a secret crime, 
carried out by powerful and often sophisticated perpetrators intent 
on silencing potential witnesses and retaining access to the spoils. 
Investigative techniques geared toward violent crime and other 
single-instance illegalities do not work in the context of entrenched 
corruption, where multiple players, often integrated hierarchically, 
operate through self-sustaining networks.  To be effective against 
active, complex public corruption networks, law enforcement 
cannot simply examine a few suspected corrupt transactions, but 
must deploy a range of criminal statutes and evidence-gathering 
procedures to build prosecutable cases.  In many countries, 
including the United States, criminal investigators and prosecutors 
 
1 Larry Diamond, Diplomacy: Institutions of Accountability, 3 HOOVER DIG. 
(1999), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3512991.html. 
2 See Hans-Joachim Rieger, Prevention—A Key Factor in Fighting Corruption: 
The Role of a New Training Concept, 8 MOSCOW ST. U. SCH. OF PUB. ADMIN. 
ELECTRONIC J. (2005) (Russ.), http://www.spa.msu.ru/e-journal/10/101_1.php 
(“[L]aw enforcement has an important preventive effect: it may even be 
considered a prerequisite for prevention, in that it points at specific corruption 
problems, thus helping create the necessary awareness. . . . Without the 
prosecution of high-level corruption, the chances of success of specific prevention 
measures may be fairly slim.”); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and the Criminal 
Law, 2  F. ON CRIME & SOC’Y at 3, U.N. Sales No. E.03.IV.2 (2002) (“[T]he criminal 
law can play a role as a backstop lying behind the needed structural changes.”); 
Claes Sandgren, Combating Corruption: The Misunderstood Role of Law, 39 INT’L LAW. 
717, 728 (2005) (“In order to effectively combat corruption, it is necessary to focus 
on the workings of institutions, not individuals.  Penal law is therefore of less 
importance than one might think.  This is not to deny, however, that the criminal 
prosecution of corrupt activities—and associated activities, such as money 
laundering—may give the business community a strong signal . . . . To charge 
high-level individuals, whether in business, public institutions or politics, with 
collusive corruption increases the trust of ordinary people in the system and 
consequently their support in the fight against corruption.”). 
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make productive use of these multi-faceted legal weapons.3  But 
investigators and prosecutors in most developing countries still 
struggle, amidst the many other obstacles that impede the fight 
against corruption, with outdated criminal procedures that do not 
support a proactive corruption investigation strategy.4 
Both regional anti-corruption conventions and the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”) recognize the 
vital role of law enforcement agencies, and contain provisions 
which promote legal reforms to better equip them to combat 
corruption.  While many legal reforms have occurred in recent 
years, most of this change has been directed at establishing new 
substantive corruption crimes.  Still missing in most countries, and 
likely to be neglected in the efforts toward comprehensive legal 
reform despite their inclusion in the UNCAC, are criminal 
procedure revisions necessary to enable law enforcement to 
effectively detect, investigate, and prosecute violations of 
substantive corruption crimes.  Without an infrastructure of 
procedural provisions supporting law enforcement’s case-making 
activities, the many new corruption crimes added to the statute 
books in developing countries may well remain mere window-
dressing.  The next step to enable law enforcement is a concise, 
coherent package of revisions drawn from and beyond the 
UNCAC, which, as a unit, deliver more than the parts could alone.  
We recognize that legal systems vary greatly, and that a single set 
of legal reform prescriptions will not fit all countries.  But a model 
legislative agenda, focused on proven law enforcement tools only, 
can provide the template many developing countries need to 
address the circumstances that impede corruption eradication 
efforts everywhere. 
 
 
3 Federal prosecutors in the United States boast very high conviction rates in 
public corruption cases.  David M. Luna, Bureau of Int’l Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, Strategies to Fight Kleptocracy (Sept. 26, 2007), available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/92911.htm (claiming an 85% conviction rate 
in 5749 individual public corruption offense suits between 2001 and 2005); see also 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE 
PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin 
/docs/arpt-2006.pdf (detailing operations of the Public Integrity Section). 
4 ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia & the Pacific, Anti-
Corruption Policies in Asia and the Pacific: Progress in Legal and Institutional 
Frameworks in 25 Countries, at xvii, Doc. 060106 (2006), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/31/36832820.pdf (noting “the low 
conviction rate in this area of crime in various countries”). 
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We present our recommendations in the context of Indonesia—
the world’s fourth largest country and consistently ranked as one 
of the most corrupt.5  Having recently rid itself of its long-term 
kleptocratic leader, and with a reform-minded president 
advancing corruption convictions as a demonstration of the 
administration’s anti-corruption resolve, the nation teeters on the 
brink of real, sustainable change.6  Many forces press against the 
anti-corruption effort in Indonesia, and there are many obstacles to 
uncovering and effectively prosecuting corruption crimes.  
Criminal investigative procedures are but one of them, but they are 
something that can change relatively easily.  Despite the fact that 
Indonesia ratified the UNCAC in 2006, we observed that many in 
law enforcement are not aware of its provisions nor realize how 
changes to their antiquated criminal procedure code and other 
laws could boost their success rates in corruption cases.7  Our 
proposed package of changes provides both a guide for legislative 
action and a focus for educating the enforcers to succeed, in 
Indonesia and in other developing countries. 
We begin this article in Section 2 with a brief discussion of the 
problem of corruption in the developing world and the many 
elements of a successful anti-corruption strategy.  We identify an 
effective prosecution capability as an essential part of the broader 
 
5 Although its score has improved somewhat over the past few years, 
Indonesia has consistently ranked near the bottom of Transparency International’s 
annual corruption perceptions index.  See J. GRAF LAMBSDORFF, TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL, 2008 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX, available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008 
(ranking Indonesia 126 out of 180); see also Indonesia Rated Asia’s Most Corrupt, 
ONENEWS, Mar. 8, 2005, http://tvnz.co.nz/view/news_world_story_skin 
/478317%3Fformat=html (citing rankings of the Political and Economic Risk 
Consultancy Ltd., which polled over 900 expatriate respondents across Asia). 
6 SOREN DAVIDSEN ET AL., CURBING CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA 2004–2006: A 
SURVEY OF NATIONAL POLICIES AND APPROACHES 20 (2006), available at 
http://www.usindo.org/publications/reports/pdf/korupsi_web.pdf (citing 2004 
comments from Indonesian President Susilo Yudhoyono that approvingly refer to 
prosecutions as “shock therapy”). 
7 Indonesia ratified the UNCAC by adopting Law Number 7 of 2006, in April 
of that year.  Indonesia’s independent Corruption Eradication Commission 
(known in Indonesia as the KPK) has analyzed its legal code to identify where 
changes need to be made to conform to UNCAC’s requirements.  CORRUPTION 
ERADICATION COMMISSION, GAP ANALYSIS STUDY REPORT: IDENTIFICATION OF GAP 
BETWEEN LAWS/REGULATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (1st ed. 2006), available at 
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Publications/E-Book-
UNCAC-Gap-Analysis-3.pdf [hereinafter KPK GAP REPORT]. 
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strategy, and then discuss that need in the context of Indonesia’s 
efforts to battle entrenched corruption.  In Section 3, we discuss the 
major criminal enforcement challenges in the investigation and 
prosecution of public corruption.  We point out the difficulties 
inherent in investigating and prosecuting corruption crimes and 
identify the tools and techniques necessary to address them—
measures that Indonesia and many other developing countries lack 
and critically need.  In Section 4, we identify gaps in the 
Indonesian criminal and procedure codes with respect to these 
important tools and techniques.  We set out a proposed legislative 
agenda in Section 5, tailored to respond to our observations in 
Indonesia, but a helpful model for the many other developing 
countries seeking to hone their criminal procedures to meet the 
challenges that public corruption presents. 
2. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE BATTLE AGAINST ENTRENCHED 
CORRUPTION 
2.1. The Crucial Role of Enforcement in a Comprehensive Anti 
Corruption Campaign 
Public corruption8 can take many forms, including bribery, 
embezzlement, theft, fraud, extortion, abuse of discretion, 
favoritism or nepotism, conflict of interest, and influence 
peddling.9  Its magnitude may vary as well, ranging from “grand” 
or “political,” which involves the highest levels of national 
 
8 In its 1997 Anti-Corruption Strategy, the World Bank defined public 
corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain.”  World Bank, Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The 
Role of the World Bank, at 8 (Sept. 1997), available at http://www1.worldbank.org 
/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf.  Others employ broader 
definitions, which include corruption by private actors as well as public 
employees.  See Transparency International, Frequently Asked Questions About 
Corruption, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter TI FAQs] (defining corruption as the “misuse of 
entrusted power for private gain”). 
9 Petter Langseth, Measuring Corruption, in MEASURING CORRUPTION 7, 10–14 
(Charles Sampford et al. eds., 2006) (describing the different techniques and 
categories of corruption); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], U.N. Dev. 
Programme, Tackling Corruption, Transforming Lives: Accelerating Human 
Development in Asia and the Pacific, at 19, U.N. Sales No. E.08.III.B.2 (2008), available 
at http://www.undprcc.lk/ext/crhdr/crhd_report/RHDR_Full%20Report 
_Tackling_Corruption_Transforming_Lives.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Dev. 
Programme Report] (focusing on corruption in the Asian and Pacific countries 
from a human development perspective). 
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government and results in distortion of central government 
functions, to “petty” or “bureaucratic,” which involves the 
exchange of small amounts of money or favors and exists within 
the established government framework.10  Corruption can be 
episodic or entrenched.  Entrenched corruption is pervasive—few 
alternatives to dealing with corrupt officials exist; organized—
corrupt officials coordinate, vertically or horizontally to sustain the 
system; and monopolistic—extensive corruption faces little political 
or social opposition.11  This kind of systemic, embedded corruption 
can exist anywhere, but it is most common in developing countries, 
where the institutional structures of lawmaking and public service 
delivery are weak, or captured, and run by the will of a corrupt 
head of state. 
Observers have differed on the degree of damage that 
corruption wreaks on developing governments and economies.  
“Revisionists” in the 1960s countered the traditional view that 
public corruption impedes modernization, arguing that corruption 
is a positive force in development, promoting economic efficiency 
and enhancing political participation, trust, and stability.12  More 
recent empirical studies challenge these conclusions generally, 
even as a number of them confirm an “East Asian paradox,” 
whereby in a number of developing nations in that area, including 
Indonesia, systemic corruption coexisted with high levels of 
economic growth.13  But the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, 
 
10 Michael Johnston & Alan Doig, Different Views on Good Government and 
Sustainable Anticorruption Strategies, in CURBING CORRUPTION: TOWARD A MODEL FOR 
BUILDING NATIONAL INTEGRITY 13, 15 (Rick Stapenhurst & Sahr J. Kpundeh eds., 
1999) (explaining the difference between political and bureaucratic corruption); 
U.N. Dev. Programme Report, supra note 9, at 20 (explaining the difference 
between grand and petty corruption). 
11 Johnston & Doig, supra note 10, at 13–14. 
12 See SAUMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 69 
(1968) (offering the “grease” hypothesis, under which the ability of government 
employees to levy bribes makes them work harder); ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL 
THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (4th ed. 1968); David Bayley, The Effects of 
Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 W. POL. Q. 719, 719 (1967) (arguing that 
bribery is a development stage with positive and negative effects); Nathaniel H. 
Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption, 8 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 
8, 10–11 (1964) (offering the “speed money” hypothesis, under which corruption 
makes economic transactions easier by eliminating bureaucratic delay); Paolo 
Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681, 681 (1995) (“The debate on the 
effects of corruption is particularly fervent. . . . [S]ome authors have suggested 
that corruption might raise economic growth . . . .”). 
13 J. Edgardo Campos et al., Corruption and Its Implications for Investment, in 
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caused at least in part by the market distortions wreaked by 
widespread corruption, took the luster off the regional 
exceptionalism.14  Most recently, expert opinion across a wide 
range of sources—including academics,15 government officials, 
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations 
(“NGOs”), the media, and business interests—has coalesced 
around the conclusion that public corruption is a malign factor16 
that negatively impacts effective government,17 economic growth,18 
 
CORRUPTION: THE BOOM AND BUST OF EAST ASIA 11 (J. Edgardo Campos ed.,  2001) 
(describing the “East Asian puzzle”); Andrew Wedeman, Development and 
Corruption: The East Asian Paradox, in POLITICAL BUSINESS IN EAST ASIA 34 (Edmund 
Gomez ed., 2001); Seung-Hyun Lee & Kyeungrae Kenny Oh, Corruption in Asia: 
Pervasiveness and Arbitrariness, 24 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 97, 98–100 (2007) (noting that 
“many Asian countries with quite high levels of corruption show high levels of 
economic development as well,” and offering the hypothesis that high economic 
development can exist where corruption is pervasive, but not arbitrary). 
14 U.N. Dev. Programme Report, supra note 9, at 32–33; Sandgren, supra note 
2, at 718 (“Even in Asia, which has traditionally had a high level of acceptance of 
corruption, a new view has emerged. . . . [In light of the 1997 financial crisis], [t]he 
previous view that corruption facilitated decision-making and thus helped 
economic progress in the region is no longer viable.”). 
15 Daniel Kaufman, Anticorruption Strategies: Starting Afresh? Unconventional 
Lessons from Comparative Analysis, in CURBING CORRUPTION: TOWARD A MODEL FOR 
BUILDING NATIONAL INTEGRITY, supra note 10, at 35, 39 (offering an empirical 
challenge to the “grease” and “speed money” arguments); Eric C. C. Chang & 
Yun-han Chu, Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian Democracies?, 68 J. POL. 
259, 269 (2006) (finding that “the level of citizens’ perceptions of corruption 
decreases their trust toward political institutions”); Johann Graf Lambsdorff, 
Corruption in Empirical Research—A Review, 9th International Anti-Corruption 
Conference (Dec. 10–15, 1999) at 2 (surveying the literature and finding a 
correlation between corruption and adverse economic effects). 
16 U.N. Dev. Programme—Oslo Governance Centre, Democratic Governance 
Fellowship Programme, The Impact of Corruption on the Human Rights Based 
Approach to Development, at 9 (Sept. 2004) (prepared by Thusitha Pilapitiya) 
[hereinafter Oslo Report] (“The negative impact of corruption on development is 
no longer questioned.”). 
17 Chang & Chu, supra note 15, at 259 (Corruption “recklessly violates the 
fundamental principles of democracy—such as accountability, equality, and 
openness”); see TI FAQs, supra note 8 (“[C]orruption—misusing publicly 
entrusted power for private gain—is inherently contradictory and irreconcilable 
with democracy.”). 
18 See, e.g., J. Eduardo Campos et al., The Impact of Corruption on Investment: 
Predictability Matters, 27 WORLD DEV. 1059, 1065 (1999) (concluding that empirical 
evidence shows corruption impedes growth); Daniel Kaufmann et al., Measuring 
Corruption: Myths and Realities, DEV. OUTREACH, Sept. 2006, available at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/september06/article.asp?id=371 
(stating that many falsely believe there is no need to monitor countries with high 
corruption, as they also have high economic growth; however, studies have 
shown that corruption adversely affects growth in the long term); Mauro, supra 
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and the protection of public and individual human rights in 
developing countries.19 
Wide recognition of the devastating effects of corruption on 
economics, political stability, and human rights globally has led to 
the emergence of a broad-based and increasingly powerful 
international anti-corruption movement.20  Its many efforts to 
 
note 12, at 705 (discussing studies that show corrupt countries with high growth 
would have even more growth without corruption); Andrew White, The Paradox of 
Corruption as Antithesis to Economic Development: Does Corruption Undermine 
Economic Development in Indonesia and China and Why are the Experiences Different in 
Each Country?,  8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2006) (“While nearly all participants 
in the debate appear to agree that corruption ultimately is antithetical to long-
term economic development, the extent to which it positively or negatively affects 
economic development in the short term depends upon highly contextual 
factors.”). 
19 The Secretary-General, Statement on the Adoption by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Oct. 31, 2003), 
available at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background 
/secretary-general-speech.html (“Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by 
diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government’s ability to 
provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign 
investment and aid.”); Oslo Report, supra note 16, at 9 (“The Seoul findings [from 
the 11th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Seoul, May 2003] declared that 
large scale corruption should be designated a crime against humanity, as for 
many around the world it falls into the same category as torture, genocide and 
other crimes against humanity that rob humans of human dignity . . . and 
confirmed the conviction that all human beings have a basic human right to live in 
a corruption-free society.”); see also Alan Doig & Stephen Riley, Corruption and 
Anti-Corruption Strategies: Issues and Case Studies from Developing Countries, in 
CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 45, 
50 (U.N. Dev. Programme ed., 2002), available at http://www.undp.org 
/governance/contactcdrom-contents/CONTACT_doc/Corruption_report 
/Content.pdf (“There is growing international consensus in development 
discourse on the damage that corruption can do to the poor, to economic growth, 
and to public integrity.”); Press Release, Transparency International, Corruption 
Still Rampant in 70 Countries Says Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 (Oct. 18, 
2005) (citing TI Chairman Peter Eigen who stated, “Corruption is a major cause of 
poverty as well as a barrier to overcoming it.  The two scourges feed off each 
other, locking their populations in a cycle of misery.”); U.S. AGENCY FOR 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT [USAID], USAID ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGY, at 5, 
USAID Doc. PD-ACA-557 (Jan. 2005) (“A strong global consensus has emerged 
that addressing corruption and building good governance is essential for the 
development of people, markets, and nations.”); Ben W. Heineman, Jr., & Fritz 
Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2006, at 75, 76 
(“[Corruption is] a major barrier to international development—systemic 
misappropriation by kleptocratic governments harms the poor.”). 
20 Entities active in supporting corruption-reduction efforts include 
international organizations, governments of developed and developing countries, 
development banks and international financial institutions, multinational 
corporations, business associations, NGOs, the media, and civil society bodies 
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address the problem—the failures, the successes, and the results in 
between—have illustrated how difficult the objective of corruption 
reduction is to achieve.  Systems of entrenched corruption are 
complex, have many causes and symptoms, and are often self-
reinforcing.  To succeed, a strategy to reduce systemic corruption 
must be multi-faceted. 
A comprehensive anti-corruption strategy includes measures 
aimed at prevention—reforming electoral, legislative, civil service, 
and administrative procedures to reduce the opportunities for 
corruption21—measures aimed at promoting public awareness and 
stimulating civil society opposition to the culture of corruption,22 
and measures aimed at detecting and punishing acts of 
corruption.23  Both intuition and evidence suggest that anti-
 
within developing countries.  BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FIGHTING GLOBAL CORRUPTION: BUSINESS RISK 
MANAGEMENT (2001), 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/fgcrpt/2001/3154.htm (describing how 
“[m]any international organizations have been making strides in addressing 
international bribery in business transactions, official public corruption, and 
transparency issues.”). 
21 See, e.g., Jeremy Pope, Elements of a Successful Anticorruption Strategy, in 
CURBING CORRUPTION: TOWARD A MODEL FOR BUILDING NATIONAL INTEGRITY, supra 
note 10, at 97 (stating that measures include simplifying procedures to remove 
gatekeepers; reducing regulatory hurdles and limiting administrators’ discretion 
to reduce the opportunities to exact bribes; implementing systems to make public 
procurement competitive and transparent; establishing oversight procedures, 
including safe avenues through which whistleblowers can report illegal activity; 
and enforcing appropriate conflict-of-interest rules); U.N. Dev. Programme 
Report, supra note 9, at 113–24 (describing civil service reforms and freedom of 
information reforms); Heineman & Heimann, supra note 19, at 75 (discussing 
measures that various organizations and nations have enacted to mitigate 
corruption). 
22 Gerald E. Caiden, A Cautionary Tale: Ten Major Flaws in Combating 
Corruption, 10 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 269, 286 (2004) (“[A]n organized public, 
triggered by outrageous scandal or prompted by unimpeachable leaders and 
other impeccable sources, is a force to be reckoned with . . . . [C]ivic culture has to 
be stirred first for without its support corruption fighters will not get far.”); see 
also U.N. Dev. Programme Report, supra note 9, at 131–46 (describing the role of 
the media and civil society organizations); Sandgren, supra note 2, at 726 (“To 
make progress there must be pressure from below.  Popular acceptance of 
corruption is a powerful ally of corruption.”). 
23 Pope, supra note 21, at 99–104 (listing prevention, enforcement, public 
awareness, and institution building); see also Jon S.T. Quah, Comparing Anti-
Corruption Measures in Asian Countries: Lessons to be Learnt, 11 ASIAN REV. PUB. 
ADMIN. 71, 77 (1999) (quoting C.V. Narasimhan, a former director of the Central  
 
Bureau of Investigation in India, as grouping anti-corruption measures into 
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corruption efforts will likely fail without at least a credible threat of 
prosecution and punishment for corrupt acts.  Persons in the 
developing world rate criminal prosecution at the top of the list of 
necessary corruption countermeasures, and may use this gauge to 
evaluate governments’ anti-corruption efforts.24  Criminal 
convictions make the most visible statement that corruption will 
not be tolerated.  In countries with an active press, major 
corruption prosecutions are big news, and successes have the 
potential to raise public awareness, dissipate cynicism, galvanize 
civil society groups, and encourage other witnesses to come 
forward.25  Effective law enforcement can supply short-term 
political capital necessary to sustain public support for long-term 
corruption reduction actions, while a failure to deliver can sap 
public support, allowing anti-corruption campaigns to atrophy. 
One product of the expanding anti-corruption consensus has 
been a series of major corruption reduction conventions adopted 
by international organizations.  These documents manifest the new 
intolerance for public corruption, condemning it in various forms 
and directing signatories to implement reform measures.26  All the 
 
“preventative, punitive, and promotional”). 
24 Daniel Kaufmann surveyed 165 high-level officials in 63 developing 
countries in 1996.  The rating was about the same for civil society representatives 
and all respondents.  Kaufmann, supra note 15, at 47–49. 
25 See Rieger, supra note 2, at 10 (“Successful law enforcement can generate a 
momentum and mobilise [sic] society against corruption.”). 
26 World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Econ. Mgmt. Network, Helping 
Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, at 58–61 (1997), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf 
(stating that conventions adopted by members of various international and 
regional organizations have directed member states to enact corruption reform 
measures); see, e.g., African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption, July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5; Council of Europe, Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 505, Europ. T.S. No. 173 
(criminalizing certain corrupt acts); Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development [OECD], Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, S. 
TREATY DOC. No. 105–43 (introducing measures to help member states combat 
corruption); Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105–39 
(providing OAS members with resources to combat local corruption); 
ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, Anti-Corruption Action 
Plan for Asia-Pacific (2001), at 2, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd 
/38/24/35021642.pdf (recommending a course of action to combat corruption in 
Asian countries); cf. U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-
3 (2000) (comparing an analogous corruption criminalization provision in U.S. 
Code). 
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conventions include provisions directed at law enforcement 
reform.  The United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(“UNCAC”), which entered into force in September 2005, is the 
global articulation of the anti-corruption legal reform movement.  
Its comprehensive strategy includes provisions aimed at 
preventing corruption, promoting civil society activity, and 
enhancing law enforcement. 
These efforts are an impressive start.  Most developing 
countries now have a range of substantive provisions prohibiting 
bribery and other acts of public corruption, although serious 
obstacles to effective enforcement of those anti-corruption laws 
exist in many of those countries.  One such obstacle is the lack of 
political will.  All too frequently, governments enact laws that 
simply list more illegal acts, or increase penalties, without 
genuinely committing to enforcing them.  Other impediments 
include the lack of resources, a lack of training and expertise, a lack 
of independence, and the lock that entrenched corruption has on 
the criminal justice institutions themselves.27  These problems of 
resolve and infrastructure are formidable and must be addressed 
in order to create a credible and sustainable law enforcement 
capacity.  But there is also a fundamental element missing in most 
of the developing world, which undermines effective anti-
corruption enforcement: law enforcement generally lacks an 
updated arsenal of procedural weapons it needs to successfully 
investigate and prosecute public corruption.  Unless remedied, this 
deficiency will continue to blunt the ameliorative effect of all other 
enforcement-enhancing reforms. 
Through many of its provisions, the UNCAC acknowledges 
this crucial deficit.  With respect to enforcement, the convention 
not only directs state parties to adopt legislation establishing 
corruption crimes—the focus of the preexisting regional 
conventions—but also recommends the implementation of 
important anti-corruption law enforcement tools and techniques.28  
 
27 See ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, Effective 
Prosecution of Corruption: Report on the Master Training Seminar, Doc. 100403 (2003), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/41/35023374.pdf (finding various 
impediments to successful anti-corruption reform by analyzing several case 
studies of failed reforms). 
28 These anti-corruption law enforcement tools include: (1) anti-money 
laundering laws, United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 14, Dec. 11, 
2003, 43 I.L.M. 37 [hereinafter UNCAC]; (2) witness protection measures, id. arts. 
25(a), 32; (3) whistleblower protection laws, id. art. 33; (4) laws authorizing 
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Many international organizations, developed nations, and NGOs 
offer ongoing assistance and monitoring to support 
implementation of the UNCAC’s many reforms.29  To date, 
however, implementation of the convention’s provisions is 
spotty.30  The convention’s directives and the recommendations in 
its lengthy legislative guide,31 while appropriate, are thin on 
context and rationale, and largely stated generally and 
provisionally.  No monitoring mechanism yet exists. 
Additionally, and particularly with respect to the enforcement 
objective, the tools and techniques most crucial to building a 
credible and sustainable prosecutorial capacity are scattered 
throughout the UNCAC’s eight chapters and seventy-one articles, 
a presentation that fails to highlight the potentially powerful and 
immediate impact of a handful of law enforcement reforms.  If 
those with the power to sway the legislature and those in law 
enforcement who could most use them fail to appreciate these key 
law enforcement tools, these crucial procedural reforms will likely 
get lost in the long process of pushing for comprehensive reform, 
or will be enacted in partial or piecemeal fashion, thereby diluting 
their potency as a unit.  Thus, the next step in aid of the anti-
corruption enforcement effort is a concise legislative package 
drawn from the on-the-ground experiences of nations facing anti-
corruption enforcement challenges similar to those currently faced 
by many developing countries.  If understood and implemented as 
a coherent system of interrelated parts, such a package of reforms 
could lay the groundwork for effective anti-corruption  
 
 
undercover operations and the admission into evidence of undercover tapes, id. 
art. 50(1); (5) laws authorizing timely access to bank account records and other 
financial data, id. art. 40; and (6) immunity and cooperation mechanisms, id. art. 
37. 
29 The United Nations has established a Global Programme Against 
Corruption to assist in implementation of the UNCAC.  See U.N. Office on Drugs 
& Crime, UNODC and Corruption, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en 
/corruption/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
30 Abid Aslam, Corruption: World Bank, U.N. Target Kleptocrats, INTER PRESS 
SERV., Sept. 17, 2007, available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39291 (“As 
with many international pacts, the corruption convention has not been high 
among many parliaments’ priorities.”). 
31 See U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime [UNODC], Div. of Treaty Aff., Legislative 
Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
U.N. Sales No. E.06.IV.16 (2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf 
/corruption/CoC_LegislativeGuide.pdf. 
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enforcement both in the short term and over the long haul as other 
reinforcing institutional reforms take hold. 
2.2. The Problem of Entrenched Public Corruption in Indonesia: 
History, Reformasi, and the Challenges to Building a Competent, 
Credible Enforcement Capability 
“It is difficult to overstate the seriousness of the problem of 
corruption in Indonesia,” begins a report assessing the status and 
success of anti-corruption initiatives implemented in Indonesia 
during recent years.32  Corruption is deeply embedded in the fabric 
of society and institutions.  And, typically, it is highly organized.  
Corruption appears to be endemic in the bureaucracy, in State 
Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”) and in government-business 
intercourse.  It is also a serious problem in the police, Attorney 
General’s Office (“AGO”) and judiciary.  “Political parties, 
parliamentarians, civil society groups and the media are not 
immune either.”33 
Corruption occurs in local, day-to-day transactions, as teachers 
exact bribes for children’s report cards, principals pocket 
exorbitant “registration fees,” petty bureaucrats require cash to 
remove the hurdles on the path to a “free” government ID card, 
traffic stops for non-existent violations result in release after 
payment of a “peace offering,” and securing a civil service post 
depends on a sufficient monetary “show of appreciation” to those 
processing the application.34  Corruption pervades the nation’s tax 
 
32 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 9. 
33 Id.; see also Transparency Int’l, Pol’y & Res. Dep’t., Report on the 
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007, at 22 tbl.4.2 (Dec. 6, 
2007), available at http://www.transparency.org/content/download/27256 
/410704/file/GCB_2007_report_en_02-12-2007.pdf (reporting Indonesian 
perceptions that the police are the most corrupt of 14 sectors in society, followed 
closely by the legal system/judiciary and the legislature).  A survey of over 1800 
businesses in Indonesia, carried out in 2001–2002, showed that over 75% of the 
firms reported paying bribes to local officials.  J. Vernon Henderson & Ari 
Kuncoro, Corruption in Indonesia 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 10674, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10674; see also 
Suwardiman,’Kompas’ Polling: Soot in the Face of Law Enforcement Institutions, 
KOMPAS, Mar. 17, 2008 (unpublished U.S. Embassy translation on file with author) 
(describing a poll on corruption by Kompas newspaper in which over 73% of 
respondents believed that no government institution was free of corruption, and 
an even higher percentage viewed law enforcement as tainted). 
34 PARTNERSHIP FOR GOVERNANCE REFORM, THE POOR SPEAK UP: 17 STORIES OF 
CORRUPTION 18, 59, 65, 84 (Ratih Hardjono & Stefanie Teggemann eds., 2002)  
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system, with desk clerks pocketing cash in exchange for 
“adjusting” the tax that must be paid,35 and occurs on a grand 
scale, as layers of government bureaucrats skim government and 
donor funding of public works projects.  The country’s anti-
corruption agency recently estimated that corruption in 
government procurement contracts alone costs the Indonesian 
government a whopping $4 billion a year.36 
Indonesia’s recent history contributes to corruption’s 
stranglehold on the country.  A sprawling archipelago in South 
East Asia, Indonesia is a nation of about 237 million people, the 
fourth largest nation in the world, and the most populous Muslim-
majority state.37  It is a vibrant country in which people of different 
religions, ethnicities, and languages intermingle, and modern pop 
cultural influences—western clothes, hip-hop music, and television 
talk shows—coexist with more traditional garb and practices.  
Serving at first as a base for the Dutch East India Company’s 
lucrative spice trade, the Indonesian islands gradually came under 
Dutch rule, which extended until Japan occupied them during 
World War II.  Indonesian nationalists led by Sukarno declared 
independence in 1945, and achieved it after a four-year guerilla 
war against the returning Dutch.  A fragile parliamentary 
democracy crumbled in 1959.  Under the rubric of “Guided 
Democracy,” President Sukarno oversaw a tightly controlled 
nation.  In the mid-1960s, a military leader, Major General Suharto, 
seized control after a bloody purge of Communist Party members 
aligned with Sukarno.38  Suharto thereafter ruled as Indonesia’s 
president from 1967 to 1998.  His thirty-year “New Order” regime 
saw major foreign investment and economic growth sustained 
alongside massive and widespread corruption perfected and 
 
(compiling firsthand accounts of corruption from impoverished Indonesian 
citizens). 
35 An Indonesian friend recounted that a desk clerk in the tax office told him, 
when he sought a tax return form, that for a fee he could determine the tax he 
would like to pay. 
36 Irawaty Wardany, Procurement Bribery Costs RI ‘Rp 36t a Year’, JAKARTA 
POST, Nov. 6, 2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/11/06 
/procurement-bribery-costs-ri-039rp-36t-year039.html. 
37 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: 
September 2008, Background Note: Indonesia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei 
/bgn/2748.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).  While 86% of Indonesia’s population 
is Muslim, it is not an Islamic state.  Id. 
38 Like many Indonesians, Sukarno and Suharto went by only one name. 
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entrenched from the Dutch colonial legacy.39  In fact, “hierarchical, 
systemic corruption became one of the central features of the New 
Order political economy.”40 
Suharto centralized state authority, and ran the government 
according to “an elaborate system of franchises.”41  He sold the 
state’s policy-making role to cronies, who became rich operating 
monopolies, fulfilling lavishly overpriced government contracts, 
and avoiding taxes.  Many foreign investors participated willingly 
in the pay-to-play system, and Suharto’s openly corrupt Indonesia 
was one of the “Asian paradox” examples used by those who 
argued that authoritarian and corrupt government structure may 
not impede, and, in fact, may often facilitate, economic growth.42  
In turn, Indonesia’s financial collapse in 1997, more severe and 
more sustained than in other Asian economies, revealed the long-
term toll of Suharto’s crony capitalism.43  In 1998, Suharto resigned 
in the wake of violent student demonstrations, and a fitful process 
of reform and multi-party democratization began.  Suharto left 
office with millions of dollars in assets.  In 2007, the Attorney 
General’s Office brought a civil suit against Suharto in an effort to 
recover over $400 million in state assets.44 
 
39 World Bank, E. Asia Poverty Reduction & Econ. Mgmt. Unit, Combating 
Corruption in Indonesia: Enhancing Accountability for Development, at 6 (Oct. 20, 2003) 
(“From this [colonial] period, Indonesia inherited such practices as paying for 
positions in government, expecting employees to cover all non-salary costs from 
their salaries, and a general blurring of lines between public and private 
resources.”); see also Dwight Y. King, Corruption in Indonesia: A Curable Cancer?, 53 
J. INT’L AFF. 603 (2000) (charting the history of corruption in Indonesia from the 
tenth century through Suharto’s “New Order”). 
40 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 9; see also THEODORE FRIEND, INDONESIAN 
DESTINIES 250–53 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003) (describing how Suharto created 
“foundations” imposing mandatory donations on taxpayers, from which billions 
were channeled to himself and his family). 
41 World Bank, supra note 39, at 6; see also Jared Levinson, Indonesia’s Odyssey: 
A Nation’s Long, Perilous Journey to the Rule of Law and Democracy, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 103, 112 (2001) (“Suharto centralized all power in Jakarta with himself as 
the supreme leader.”). 
42 World Bank, supra note 39, at 7–8 (summarizing arguments of Goodpaster, 
McLeod, and McIntyre). 
43 U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Anti-Corruption Policy Making in 
Practice: What Can Be Learned for Implementing Article 5 of UNCAC? 87–88 (Karen 
Hussman ed., 2007), available at http://www.u4.no/themes/uncac/report.cfm 
[hereinafter U4 Report]. 
44 Peter Gelling, Indonesian Prosecutors File Civil Suit Against Suharto for $441 
Million, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 9, 2007, http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php 
?id=6570502; Soeharto Stole Millions from Charity: Witness, VOICE OF INDONESIA, 
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Suharto left behind not only the remnants of economic and 
environmental plunder, but also government structures, a business 
community, and civil society accustomed to what Indonesians refer 
to by the acronym KKN—corruption, collusion and nepotism—as 
an everyday fact of life.  Since the fall of Suharto, a raucous and 
energetic media and a spate of new civil society organizations has 
kept the spotlight on public corruption and helped ensure that 
fighting corruption remains a high-profile political issue for 
candidates competing for votes.45  In the period of reform, or 
Reformasi, since Suharto’s departure, Indonesia has had four 
presidents, all of whom have—under international pressure and 
with substantial international, private business, and NGO 
assistance—undertaken efforts to address the rampant corruption.  
Each has put forth law enforcement as a centerpiece of the 
campaign—a crucial part of the “shock therapy,” which, according 
to the current president, the country needs to eradicate corruption 
both structurally and culturally.46 
But transforming the aspiration of clean, effective anti-
corruption law enforcement into a reality in an environment of 
entrenched corruption like Indonesia’s is a formidable 
undertaking.  As in many other developing countries, a 
fundamental problem with relying upon the criminal justice 
system as an instigator of corruption reform is that corruption runs 
through the very institutions with law enforcement responsibility: 
the National Police,47 the Attorney General’s Office, and the 
judiciary, including the Supreme Court.48  Observers claim that 
 
Nov. 21, 2007, http://www.voi.co.id/news/9/tahun/2007/bulan/11/tanggal 
/21/id/586; see also ROBIN HODESS, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL 
CORRUPTION REPORT 2004, 13 tbl.1.1 (2004), available at http://www.transparency 
.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2004#download (listing 
recent corrupt leaders and estimated amounts of embezzled funds). 
45 U4 Report, supra note 43, at 95–96, 102–103; Media Reports Help Uncover 
Corruption Cases: KPK Chief, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 23, 2008, http://kbri-
beirut.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=80. 
46 “We Need Shock Therapy,” TIME, Nov. 1, 2004, http://www.time.com 
/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501041108-749480,00.html; see also U4 Report, 
supra note 43, at 91–92 (describing the history of anti-corruption initiatives in post-
Suharto Indonesia). 
47 World Bank, supra note 39, at 84–86; Reh Atemalem, Survey: Police Most 
Corrupt Institution in Indonesia, TEMPO, Dec. 7, 2007 (on file with author). 
48 World Bank, supra note 39, at 88–90; SEBASTIAN POMPE, THE INDONESIAN 
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE 416 (2005) (“It is currently 
common knowledge that the Supreme Court is affected by corruption, and judges 
in private conversation have referred to it for many years as a routine matter.”); 
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investigation results,49 prosecution decisions,50 and court verdicts51 
have been bought. 
 
 
see also Atemalem, supra note 47; U4 Report, supra note 43, at 89; Abdul Khalik, 
Corrupt Legal Institutions Impede Graft Reforms: NGOs, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 29, 2008, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/01/28/corrupt-legal-institutions-
impede-graft-reforms-ngos.html; Andreas D. Arditya, Court Chief Suspended for 
‘Mischievous’ Conduct, JAKARTA POST, July 12, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost 
.com/node/174576. 
49 Saldi Isra, Getting Rid of Corruption in Indonesia: The Future, JAKARTA POST, 
Dec. 31, 2004, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/12/31/getting-rid-
corruption-indonesia-future.html (noting that “[i]t is widely believed that the 
issuance of an SP3 [Letter for the Termination of an Investigation] often depends 
on a bribe.”). 
50 Indonesian A-G Signals Crackdown on Corrupt Prosecutors, ABC NEWS 
ONLINE, May 14, 2007, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/05/14 
/1922751.htm (“Indonesia’s new Attorney-General has admitted four out of five 
prosecutors in Indonesia are open to corruption but says he will root out the 
wrongdoers.”); see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS [PWC] & BRIT. INST. OF INT’L & 
COMP. LAW [BIICL], FOCUS ON PEOPLE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNANCE 
AUDIT OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 38-40 
(July 2001) [hereinafter PWC & BIICL REPORT].  In March 2008, shortly after the 
Attorney General’s Office announced that it was terminating a major 
investigation, the lead prosecutor in the matter was arrested in Jakarta by the 
Corruption Eradication Commission as he accepted a payment of over $600,000.  
See generally Prosecutor Held for Alleged Bribery, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 4, 2008, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/03/03/prosecutor-held-alleged-
bribery.html; Lilian Budianto, Question of Integrity for Prosecutors, JAKARTA POST, 
Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/03/06/question-
integrity-prosecutors.html; Bribery Case Puts AGO Officals [sic] in the Spotlight, 
JAKARTA POST, June 13, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/13 
/bribery-case-puts-ago-officals-spotlight.html.  The prosecutor was subsequently 
convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison.  Irawaty Wardany, Disgraced Urip 
Gets 20 Years, JAKARTA POST, Sept. 5, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news 
/2008/09/05/disgraced-urip-gets-20-years.html. 
51 An assessment of justice sector integrity in two Indonesian provinces, 
conducted by the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, found that high percentages of 
lawyers, prisoners, court users and business people were aware of instances in 
which bribes had been paid to judges, prosecutors, police and court staff.  
UNODC, Assessment of Justice Sector Integrity and Capacity in Two Indonesian 
Provinces: Technical Assessment Report, 27–37 (Mar. 2006) available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publications_indonesia_e_assessment.p
df) (reporting statistics indicating a perception of corruption); see also Adrian 
Verity, Skewed Justice in Indonesia’s Tainted Courts, ASIA SENTINEL, Aug. 21, 2006, 
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=9
7&Itemid=31 (“[A]ccording to Asep Rahmat Fajar, head of the Indonesian Judicial 
Monitoring Society . . . ‘buying court verdicts has been a systematic and organized 
crime in the country’s legal system.  It involves people from the highest levels, 
such as high court judges, down to the lowest levels, such as administrative staff 
in the Supreme Court.”).  See also Levinson, supra note 41, at 114–15 (describing 
some of the corruption in Indonesia’s legal system). 
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The structures and traditions of the investigatory and 
prosecutorial services do not facilitate effective anti-corruption 
enforcement.  Both the police and the prosecution service in 
Indonesia are managed through a highly centralized, hierarchical 
chain of command.52  In the AGO, which includes Indonesia’s 
prosecution service,53 the effect of this top-down management 
system is that most serious measures require multiple levels and 
review and approval,54 reducing the ability of prosecutors to act 
quickly or innovate.  This institutional rigidity reinforces the 
inherited Dutch civil law tradition that accords little discretion to 
prosecutors to follow the evidence to find new crimes and 
suspects.  Concern that prosecutors in Indonesia might misuse 
greater discretion for corrupt purposes, however, means that 
internal reforms, at least in the short term, are not likely to focus on 
changing this aspect of how prosecutors function. 
Additionally, laws adopted during the Suharto era explicitly 
separated the investigatory and prosecutorial functions between 
the National Police and the AGO, so that prosecutors cannot 
oversee investigations by the police, and the Attorney General has 
a limited ability to establish policy that binds investigators outside 
his office.55  Under the procedure code, the police may obtain 
 
52 See PWC & BIICL REPORT, supra note 50, at 30–31 (describing the history of 
Indonesia’s hierarchical system); World Bank, supra note 39, at 86–87 (noting the 
“excessive hierarchical layers” of which there are seven).  The police and 
prosecution service were militarized during the Suharto era.  Although both were 
separated from the armed forces after the fall of Suharto, vestiges remain.  
Prosecutors wear uniforms and salute their superiors. 
53 In Indonesia, as in many civil law countries, the prosecution service is part 
of the Attorney General’s Office, and is separate from the Ministry of Law, which 
is under the direction of the Minister of Law and is responsible for drafting 
legislation, developing legal policy, and overseeing various functions including 
prisons and the customs service. 
54 PWC & BIICL REPORT, supra note 50, at 30–31; World Bank, supra note 39, at 
87. 
55 At the time, the compartmentalization was viewed as a reform which 
created checks and balances and avoided excessive concentration of criminal 
enforcement powers.  PWC & BIICL REPORT, supra note 50, at 27–29.  Now, with 
prosecutors widely regarded as having operated as instruments of an 
authoritarian government, and with rampant corruption within the prosecution 
service openly acknowledged, the notion that prosecutors should have greater 
discretion in charging and resolving cases to enhance the anti-corruption effort is 
viewed with skepticism.  Indeed, the 2002 law which created the Corruption 
Eradication Commission and gave it prosecutorial authority in corruption cases 
specifically divested the agency of the authority to terminate an investigation or a 
prosecution once one had been initiated.  Law Number 30 of 2002 on the 
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warrants to search, seize, and arrest without the necessity of 
contact with prosecutors, and may question witnesses and take 
other investigative actions.56  Once an investigation is complete, 
both the investigative file and responsibility for custody of the 
suspect passes to the prosecution, and police generally have no 
further role in the process.57  The lack of close coordination 
between the police and the AGO, and the turf jealousies that arise 
from the compartmentalization of their functions, impede effective 
preparation and presentation of cases across the entire spectrum of 
law enforcement, and create particular problems in the corruption 
area, where the separation of functions makes it nearly impossible 
for prosecutors to employ the highly effective strategy of pursuing 
a series of investigations simultaneously to dismantle a network of 
corruptors.58  Some greater investigatory authority exists, and 
some investigators are employed, within the AGO’s Special Crimes 
division, which handles public corruption cases.  The division of 
the AGO into the Special Crimes and General Crimes departments, 
with different and potentially overlapping jurisdictions, however, 
presents enforcement impediments of its own. 59  The dispersal of 
prosecutorial jurisdiction means that prosecutions of public 
corruption in Indonesia are rarely combined with prosecutions of 
related crimes, such as tax and customs offenses, illegal logging, 
and money laundering, which in turn means that law enforcement 
forfeits the opportunity to bring multiple criminal charges to bear 
 
Commission to Eradicate Criminal Acts of Corruption (Indon.).  While these 
concerns are legitimate, in the longer term only more discretion, not less, will 
transform Indonesian prosecutors into effective instruments against corruption.  
This concept is gaining ground in the country; a draft of a new criminal procedure 
code includes some provisions which strengthen prosecutorial discretion.  See 
generally Robert Strang, “More Adversarial But Not Completely Adversarial”: 
Reformasi of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
(forthcoming 2008). 
56 Law Number 8 of 1981 Concerning the Law of Criminal Procedure, arts. 
16–24, 32–49, & 106–33 (Indon.) (setting forth the rules for arrest, search, seizure, 
and investigation). 
57 Id. arts. 25, 137–44 (detailing rules for prosecution). 
58 PWC & BIICL REPORT, supra note 50, at 28–29.  Our own discussions with 
Indonesian prosecutors indicated that they usually had little knowledge of 
corruption investigations prior to a completed dossier being delivered by the 
police, and that the prosecutors were often dissatisfied with steps that had been 
taken during the investigative stage. 
59 The Special Crimes division handles the prosecution of public corruption 
and human rights crimes, while the General Crimes division handles all other 
criminal prosecutions.  PWC & BIICL REPORT, supra note 50, at 33–35. 
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on corruption defendants. 
Since the fall of Suharto, various efforts have been and are 
being made to address these problems of institutional corruption 
and structure.  Anti-corruption legislation was passed in 1999,60 
2001,61 and again in 2002.62  In line with other nations facing deeply 
entrenched corruption and with the directives of numerous anti-
corruption conventions,63 the latter statute created the Corruption 
Eradication Commission, or KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi), 
an independent corruption-fighting agency equipped with its own 
investigators and prosecutors, authority to independently 
investigate and prosecute major corruption cases, and a new Anti-
Corruption Court to hear its cases.64  These structures together 
establish a route for public corruption investigations and 
prosecutions to circumvent the existing criminal justice 
apparatus.65  Although their jurisdictions overlap, the KPK has the 
authority to take over investigations or prosecutions from the 
police or AGO if there is delay, bias, obstructive influence asserted 
by another government branch, or other circumstances indicating 
the police or AGO are not handling the case responsibly.66 
The KPK’s responsibilities extend well beyond criminal 
enforcement, but its prosecutions have been most visible.  Its 
 
60 Law Number 28 of 1999 on on a Corruption-free State Administration 
(Indon.); Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offenses (Indon.). 
61 Law Number 20 of 2001, Amendment to Law Number 31 of 1999 on 
Eradication of Corruption Offenses (Indon.). 
62 Law Number 30 of 2002 on the Commission for the Eradication of Criminal 
Acts of Corruption (Indon.). 
63 E.g., UNCAC, supra note 28, art. 6 (directing parties to establish 
preventative anti-corruption bodies).  Singapore, Hong Kong, Botswana, and 
other countries have long had independent anti-corruption agencies.  Other 
countries have formed similar units in recent years.  See U.N. Dev. Programme, 
Democratic Governance Practice Team, Institutional Arrangements to Combat 
Corruption: A Comparative Study, 3–10 (2005), available at 
http://regionalcentrebangkok.undp.or.th/practices/governance/documents/Co
rruption_Comparative_Study-200512.pdf (comparing the anti-corruption efforts 
of other southeast Asian countries). 
64 Law Number 30 of 2002, Commission for the Eradication of Criminal Acts 
of Corruption, arts. 53–62 (Indon.). 
65 The preamble to the 2002 law which created the KPK specifically observes 
that existing government agencies had not been effective in handling corruption 
cases, and the law itself states that the KPK is to operate “independently, free 
from any and all influence,” with the “primary purpose of improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of efforts to eradicate criminal acts of corruption.”  Id. 
pmbl, arts. 3–4. 
66 Id. arts. 8–10, 42, 68. 
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leadership, five commissioners selected by the legislature from a 
list submitted by the president, sees investigations and 
prosecutions as “the cutting edge for implementing broader 
institutional reforms . . . .”67 
The KPK served notice early on that attacking corruption in 
law enforcement and the judiciary was a priority,68 and the agency 
has posted a number of prosecutorial accomplishments during its 
first several years of operation.69  Still, criticism of the agency’s 
 
67 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 48; see also U4 Report, supra note 43, at 92 
(noting that while the KPK has a mandate to implement preventive measures, “at 
the moment the emphasis of KPK is more focused on investigation and 
prosecution.”). 
68 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 48.  The KPK arrested five clerks at the 
Supreme Court and charged them with extorting defendants.  The investigation 
led to the execution of a search warrant in the chambers of the Chief Justice 
himself, although the KPK was not able to prove that the Chief Justice was part of 
the extortion activity.  Muninggar Sri Saraswati, Antigraft Team Raids Supreme 
Court, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 28, 2005, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news 
/2005/10/28/antigraft-team-raids-supreme-court.html; New Judges to Hear Probo 
Case, JAKARTA POST, Nov. 5, 2005, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/11 
/05/new-judges-hear-probo-case.html. 
69 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 53–54 (crediting the KPK with “[i]nitiating 
a growing number of investigations and prosecutions . . . (which resulted in the 
convictions of former Aceh Governor Puteh and members of the KPK”); see also 
Tim Lankester, Reform of Indonesia’s Governance: Myth or Reality?, STRAITS TIMES, 
Apr. 9, 2007, http://www.ytlcommunity.com/commnews/shownews.asp 
?newsid=28804 (“The [KPK] has held hundreds of investigations and prosecuted 
former ministers, business leaders, judges, governors and legislators.”).   
 There has been steady growth in the number of corruption cases brought by 
the KPK.  In 2004, the year the Court came into existence, one single case was 
filed.  Sixteen new cases were filed in 2005, and 25 new cases were filed in 2006.   
ANTI-CORRUPTION COURT, CENT. JAKARTA DIST. COURT, ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2006); 
see also KPK, ANNUAL REPORT 2006, 4.5–4.12 (2006), available at 
http://www.kpk.go.id/modules/wmpdownloads/files/Annual_Report_2006_4.
pdf. [hereinafter KPK ANNUAL REPORT] (noting an increase in the court’s 
caseload).  Notable recent cases have included the convictions of a former national 
police chief, and the arrests of the governor of the central bank and several 
members of the national legislature.  See, e.g., Andra Wisnu & Andreas D. Arditya, 
DPR Warns KPK over Targeting Lawmakers, JAKARTA POST, July 4, 2008, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/07/04/dpr-warns-kpk-over-
targeting-lawmakers.html; Andreas D. Arditya, Lawmaker Admits Receiving Bribes, 
JAKARTA POST, July 16, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/07/16 
/lawmaker-admits-receiving-bribes.html; Ex-Police Chief Sentenced for Graft, 
JAKARTA POST, June 12, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/12 
/expolice-chief-sentenced-graft.html; Graft Body Finally Detains BI Chief, JAKARTA 
POST, Apr. 11, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/04/11/graft-
body-finally-detains-bi-chief.html; KPK Arrests Lawmaker for Alleged Bribery, 
JAKARTA POST, Apr. 10, 2008, http://old.thejakartapost.com/detailweekly.asp 
?fileid=20080410.@01. 
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efforts include perceived failures to set its sights up the hierarchy 
to capture “big fish” corruptors70 and to reach out of the capital 
and into the nation’s many widespread provinces where 
corruption flourishes after the decentralization that occurred post-
Suharto.71  A more recent complaint is that the agency’s 
investigations have the appearance of political targeting in the 
lead-up to the 2009 elections.72  In December 2007, a new board of 
five KPK Commissioners was selected following the end of the 
statutory four-year term of the initial team.73 
Other efforts to step up the battle against corruption, both in 
terms of short-term prosecutions and long-term institutional 
reform, gained significant momentum after the election of 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in October 2004.  
 
70 Abdul Khalik, KPK Accused of Half-Hearted Fight, JAKARTA POST, May 5, 
2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/05/05/kpk-accused-
halfhearted-fight.html; see also Suharto Scion’s Channel Islands Treasure Hunt, ASIA 
SENTINEL, Mar. 12, 2007, http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com 
_content&task=view&id=417&Itemid=31 (“[C]ritics say the only big fish that have 
been netted and delivered all the way to the dock so far are those connected to his 
political opponents . . . .”). 
71 See DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 35 (“SBY’s shock therapy on 
corruption . . . is only happening in Jakarta.”) (quoting Ervyn Kaffah, National 
Coalition of NGOs Against Corruption). 
72 See Politics Still a Factor in Graft Probes, Say Observers, JAKARTA POST, Nov. 
17, 2007, http://www.suedostasienportal.de/thread.php?postid=27853&sid 
=aa81ea871b7d35b7a91e58290d723202#post2785 (noting that critics state “political 
power still comes into play” in the KPK’s corruption enforcement); see also Bill 
Guerin, Politics of Corruption in Indonesia, ASIA TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IC29Ae01.html (noting 
“[g]rowing opposition complaints of discriminatory justice” being aimed at the 
KPK). 
73 The KPK is run by a board of five commissioners, selected by the president 
from a pool suggested by a selection committee.  Law Number 30 of 2002, 
Commission for the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption, arts. 21(1), 26(1), 
30 (Indon.).  They may serve a term of four years, with the possibility of being 
reappointed to one additional term.  Id. art. 34.  The initial board was appointed in 
late 2003, and the candidates for the new board were submitted in late 2007.  Desy 
Nurhayati, Review KPK Candidates: NGOs, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 3, 2007, 
http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20071003.H05; see also 
Azhar Vows to Fight Graft, THE POINT, Dec. 19, 2007 (on file with author); No 
‘Angels’, Ten Names of Corruption Eradication Commission Head Candidates Have Been 
Submitted to the President, TEMPO, Sept. 18–24, 2007, http://fcpp-
indonesia.org/eng/news_and_events/current_issues/no_angels; Peter Gelling, 
Indonesian Corruption Fighters under Question, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 28, 2007, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/28/asia/indo.php (noting the 
appointment of new KPK commissioners). 
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Yudhoyono campaigned on an anti-corruption platform.74  His 
government’s approach to the formidable task of fighting 
entrenched corruption has been both comprehensive and 
incremental.  Measures implemented address multiple aspects of 
corruption reform, including prevention, state-building, and civil 
society education.  The “most noticeable thrust,” however, “has 
been in the realm of prosecutions.”75  A 2005 presidential order 
created a Coordinating Team for the Eradication of Criminal 
Corrupt Acts (known by its Indonesian acronym as Timtas Tipikor), 
a temporary interdepartmental anti-corruption task force that 
brought together police investigators, auditors, and prosecutors 
from the AGO to develop and prosecute corruption cases against 
government officials.76  Although now disbanded, during its two 
years of existence it successfully prosecuted the former Minister of 
Religious Affairs, a judge, and others for public corruption.77  
Within the AGO, prosecutions of corruption cases have increased,78 
and the formation of an elite anti-corruption team was recently 
announced.79  A recent report by a foreign donors’ organization 
 
74 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 17 (discussing the significant problems 
that follow from running (and winning) on an anti-corruption platform) . 
75 Id. at 2. 
76 Presidential Decree Number 11 of 2005 (Indon.); Eva C. Komandjaja & 
Muninggar Sri Saraswati, Antigraft Teams May Overlap, JAKARTA POST, May 7, 2005, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/05/07/antigraft-teams-may-
overlap.html. 
77 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 20, app. 4; Ridwan Max Sijabat, Former 
Religious Affairs Minister Faces Life in Jail, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 7, 2005, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/10/07/former-religious-affairs-
minister-faces-life-jail.html (describing prosecution of  former minister); L.R. 
Baskoro et al., The Sting at Chamoe-Chamoe, TEMPO, Jan. 17–23, 2005 (on file with 
author) (chronicling the events of a government sting against a corrupt judge); M. 
Taufiqurrahman, Govt Disbands Anti-graft Team, JAKARTA POST, June 12, 2007, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/06/12/govt-disbands-antigraft-
team.html. 
78 E.g., U4 Report, supra note 43, at 90 (noting that in 2006 prosecutors across 
Indonesia were handling 265 corruption cases involving local legislators and 46 
involving provincial or district heads, an “unprecedented phenomenon in 
Indonesia”); see also Lankester, supra note 69 (“The special crimes case load of the 
Attorney-General has increased by nearly six times over the past five years.”); 
Scores of Officials Grilled, Tried for Graft, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 4, 2008,  
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/08/04/scores-officials-grilled-tried-
graft.html (noting that almost 78 officials were being tried or investigated for 
alleged corruption). 
79 Special Team is Not Set up Because the District Attorney’s Office Lost a Step from 
the Corruption Eradication Commission, KOMPAS, June 6, 2008 (unpublished U.S. 
Embassy translation on file with author); see also U.S. Pledges to Help Eradicate 
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observed that “[l]aw enforcement seems to have made some 
impact in Indonesia.  The punitive measures are sending a strong 
message that corruption is not risk-free, and some Indonesian 
commentators are claiming that these measures are changing the 
way bureaucrats behave.”80  Many other watchdogs complain, 
however, that the government remains hampered by official foot-
dragging and corruption, 81 and that with respect to enforcement, 
investigations still proceed too slowly82 and too many defendants 
receive light sentences or walk free.83 
Efforts to prevent corruption in the justice sector have been 
somewhat less noteworthy,84 but some progress has been made in 
reforming the existing criminal justice institutions.  Oversight 
commissions have been established for the judiciary, the police, 
and the prosecution service to investigate complaints of corruption 
and to pursue disciplinary actions.85  The current president’s 
 
Corruption, JAKARTA POST, June 10, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com 
/news/2008/06/10/us-pledges-help-eradicate-corruption.html (discussing the 
U.S. pledge of support in the context of the newly created anti-corruption unit 
within the AGO). 
80 U4 Report, supra note 43, at 109. 
81 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1–2 (“[T]here also are real political and 
bureaucratic constraints on the pace and scope of reform.  Because the president’s 
cabinet is essentially a coalition government, his ability to push (or punish) his 
Ministers and other senior officials is limited.”); see also Lankester, supra note 69 
(“President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono would like to take action. But his hands 
appear to be tied due to opposition from the Chief Justice (who recently extended 
his own term until 2008) and from some leading members of his Cabinet. . . .  [I]t 
is disappointing that Parliament, instead of acting as a check on corruption, has 
become part of the problem.”). 
82 Desy Nurhayati, Graft Probes Are “Too Slow”, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 9, 2007, 
http://old.thejakartapost.com/detailweekly.asp?fileid=20071009.@01 (noting that 
corruption probes took on average two and a half years to complete and were 
“too slow” during the first half of 2007). 
83 Fabio Scarpello, Reversing Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Drive, ASIA TIMES, 
Mar. 6, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IC06Ae01.html 
(“According to ICW [Indonesia Corruption Watch], of the 125 corruption cases 
heard last year at the Administrative Court, 40 of the defendants were released 
without sanction, and of those convicted, most received light sentences.”); Verity, 
supra note 51 (“ICW notes that 142 defendants were exonerated in 77 corruption 
cases from 1999 to 2006.”). 
84 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 6 (“The Yudhoyono government’s 
emphasis on prosecution, commendable as it is, has not been matched to date by a 
comparably vigorous effort to prevent corruption from occurring within the 
bureaucracy.  Until meaningful checks on corruption and collusion are introduced 
into the civil service, the threat of punishment will have, at best, only a limited 
deterrent effect.”). 
85 Law Number 22 of 2004 Establishing Judicial Commission (Indon.); 
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appointees as National Police Chief and Attorney General are 
generally viewed as improvements over appointees from prior 
administrations.86  Reforms are underway in both the Indonesian 
National Police and the AGO, and in both agencies a process of 
incremental change has resulted in the weeding out of a number of 
dishonest officials.87  The Partnership for Governance Reform, an 
 
Presidential Decree Number 17 of 2005 Establishing Police Commission (Indon.); 
Presidential Decree Number 18 of 2005 Establishing Prosecution Commission 
(Indon.); Judicial Commission Hears Call for More Aggressive Action, JAKARTA POST,  
 
Nov. 30, 2007, http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid 
=20071130.D11; Corruption Body Busts Judicial Commission Member, JAKARTA POST, 
Sept. 27, 2007, http://old.thejakartapost.com/detailweekly.asp?fileid 
=20070927.@05 (proving that even those charged with rooting out corruption may 
themselves be tainted, a Judicial Commission member was arrested by the KPK in 
connection with a procurement kickback scheme); Prosecutors Demand 6 Years for 
Irawady in Graft Trial, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 23, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost 
.com/news/2008/02/22/prosecutors-demand-6-years-irawady-graft-trial.html. 
86 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 20; Budi Setyarso et al., Sutanto’s Promises, 
TEMPO, Aug. 29–Sept. 4, 2006 (on file with author) (reviewing National Police 
Chief Sutanto’s reforms in his first year).  An expert on Indonesia recently wrote 
that Yudhoyono’s appointment of “a strong reformist Attorney-General, 
Hendarman Supandji, probably strengthens the counter-corruption fight, lending 
credibility to SBY’s popular counter-corruption campaign.”  Douglas E. Ramage, 
A Reformed Indonesia, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Oct. 12, 2007, at 1. 
87 See AGO Told to Get Tough on Crooked Prosecutors, JAKARTA POST, July 24, 
2006, http://www.asia-pacific-solidarity.net/southeastasia/indonesia/netnews 
/2006/ind27v10.htm; Ramage, supra note 86, at 9 (discussing reform efforts in the 
police and customs service, and noting that public perceptions of the police have 
been improving in recent years); Robert La Mont, The AGO’s Fight Against 
Corruption, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 14, 2007, http://www.ppatk.go.id/berita.php 
?nid=2634 (discussing internal reforms being carried out by Attorney General 
Supandji).   
 The arrest of a senior prosecutor by the KPK on bribery charges in early 
March 2008 substantially increased pressure on Supandji to take action against 
corrupt prosecutors.  Abdul Khalik, Rid AGO of Corrupt Officials: MPs, JAKARTA 
POST, June 17, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/17/rid-ago-
corrupt-officials-mps.html; Adianto P. Simamora, Kalla Wants Tough Action 
Against AGO Corruption, JAKARTA POST, June 14, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost 
.com/news/2008/06/14/kalla-wants-tough-action-against-ago-corruption.html; 
Adianto P. Simamora, VP Rejects Calls to Dismiss Hendarman, JAKARTA POST, June 
21, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/21/vp-rejects-calls-
dismiss-hendarman.html.  In response, Supandji pledged full cooperation with 
the KPK, made administrative changes, opened his own internal investigation, 
and pledged that “[t]here’s no forgiveness . . . for anyone involved.”  Attorney’s 
Arrest a Blow for Hendarman, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 4, 2008, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/03/03/attorney039s-arrest-a-blow-
hendarman.html; Dewi Indriastuti, Reorganizing the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the 
Homework is Not Yet Finished, KOMPAS, June 4, 2008 (unpublished U.S. Embassy 
translation on file with author); AGO Begins Investigation of Top Prosecutors, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/3
2008] LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INDONESIA 209 
 
Indonesian NGO funded by the UNDP, has been assisting the 
Attorney General and others in the justice sector with institutional 
reforms,88 and several agencies, including USAID, AusAID, the 
U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the U.S. Justice 
Department’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development 
Assistance and Training, are sponsoring multi-year projects, which 
include supporting institutional reform in the AGO and the 
courts.89 
Yudhoyono is viewed as personally clean, and most see him as 
trying to do the right thing, but hampered by holdovers from the 
Suharto regime in Parliament, in the judiciary, and within his own 
administration.90  Surveys conducted by Transparency 
International show improvement from 2006 to 2007 in how 
Indonesians rate their government’s effectiveness in fighting 
corruption.91  Nevertheless, many Indonesians are increasingly 
 
JAKARTA POST, June 18, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/18 
/ago-begins-investigation-top-prosecutors.html; Dian Kuswandini, Hendarman 
Admits AGO is in ‘Crisis of Credibility’, JAKARTA POST, July 23, 2008, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/node/175580; Wardany, supra note 50. 
88 The Partnership was active in assisting the AGO in compiling the Agenda 
of Attorney General’s Office Reform (2005), a booklet outlining areas for study 
and internal reform with the assistance of donors.  The Partnership for 
Governance Reform, http://kemitraan.or.id (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
89 See USAID/Indonesia: Democracy and Governance, 
http://indonesia.usaid.gov/en/Program.3a.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) 
(describing the Justice Sector Reform program); Indonesia Australia Legal 
Development Facility, http://www.indo.ausaid.gov.au/projects/legaldevprg 
.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (providing a generic overview of the Indonesia 
Australia Legal Development Facility) ; Millenium Challenge Corporation [MCC], 
Indonesia, http://www.mcc.gov/countries/indonesia/index.php (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2008) (describing the MCC’s two-year, $55 million program of assistance); 
Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance 
and Training, DOJ/OPDAT Asia Pacific Programs, http://www.usdoj.gov 
/criminal/opdat/asia-pacific/asia-pacific-prgs.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) 
(describing OPDAT programs in Indonesia). 
90 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1 (“President Yudhoyono is committed to 
punishing corruption, and there is a small but significant constellation of reform-
minded actors inside and outside the government who have the potential to make 
a difference.”); Abdul Khalik, Soeharto Loyalists ‘Thwart War on Graft’, JAKARTA 
POST, Jan. 25, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/01/24/soeharto 
-loyalists-thwart-war-graft039.html (reporting on issues leading up to the 
conference of State Parties to the UNCAC); see generally Lankester, supra note 69. 
91 Compare Transparency Int’l, Pol’y & Res. Dept., Report on the Transparency 
International Global Corruption Barometer 2006, at 19 tbl.5 (2006), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/12169/115654/version/1/file
/Global_Corruption_Barometer_2006_Report.pdf (indicating for 2006 that only 
29% of Indonesians rated their government’s efforts to fight corruption as 
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critical of the Yudhoyono administration’s record in eradicating 
corruption after over three years in office, and are questioning its 
commitment to take the steps needed to generate results matching 
his anti-corruption rhetoric.92  Indonesia’s anti-corruption 
campaign is thus at a crucial crossroads, with the efficacy and 
integrity of corruption prosecutions at its center.  Demonstrating 
success in detecting and prosecuting corruption crimes will be 
necessary to stave off apathy and cynicism and maintain the 
political will and patience necessary to sustain more long-term 
changes. 
A police corps, prosecutor’s office, and judiciary reasonably 
free from corruption are prerequisites for obtaining criminal 
convictions that can gain public respect, and in Indonesia these 
things will be a challenge to achieve.  But even clean and efficient 
law enforcement institutions cannot make headway against 
entrenched public corruption without the appropriate legal tools in 
their arsenals to investigate and prosecute those crimes.  There 
have been legal reforms implemented in the post-Suharto era, but 
with respect to law enforcement, these efforts have been directed 
primarily at creating the KPK and amending the criminal code to 
create substantive corruption crimes.  The Indonesian penal code, 
inherited from the Dutch, already included several anti-corruption 
provisions.93  Many more far-reaching anti-corruption laws were 
enacted during the burst of legal reform following the fall of 
Suharto.  These include laws prohibiting bribery and bribe-
 
“effective” or “very effective”, while 50% rated those efforts as “not effective,” 
and a further 18% reported that the government did not combat corruption at all 
or actually encouraged it) with Transparency Int’l, supra note 33, at 24 tbl.4.4 
(indicating  that 37% of Indonesians rated their government’s efforts to fight 
corruption as “effective”, while 47% rated those efforts “ineffective.”); see also 
Abdul Khalik, Survey Sees Progress in Graft Fight, JAKARTA POST, Sept. 24, 2008, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/09/24/survey-sees-progress-graft-
fight.html (discussing the Transperency International report). 
92 See, e.g., Dicky Christanto, Officials Using ‘Backroom Deals’ to Tackle 
Corruption, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 26, 2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com 
/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20071226.M01; Government ‘Not Serious’ in Graft Fight, 
JAKARTA POST, Dec. 27, 2007, http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp 
?fileid=20071227.E04; SBY-JK Assessed to Have Failed in Eradicating Corruption, 
KOMPAS, Dec. 28, 2007 (unpublished U.S. Embassy translation on file with author); 
2007 a ‘Gloomy Year’ for Corruption Fight, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 29, 2007, 
http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20071229.F01. 
93 See, e,g., PENAL CODE, arts. 209 (bribery of public officials), 210 (bribery of 
judges), 415 (embezzlement by public officials), 418 (public officials accepting 
bribes), 419 (judges accepting bribes), 425 (extortion by public officials) (Indon.). 
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taking,94 and creating rudimentary restitution and forfeiture 
provisions and a corporate liability provision.95  A few substantive 
criminal laws which are part of most modern, comprehensive 
corruption-investigation legal regimes have successfully made 
their way into the flurry of reform.  These include provisions 
establishing new obstruction of justice and false statement offenses 
for corruption cases,96 and criminalizing the offenses that constitute 
money laundering.97 
However, far less legislative attention has been directed at 
updating the supporting procedural apparatus that would allow 
law enforcement to effectively investigate and prosecute the newly 
added and revamped corruption crimes.  The provisions of the 
Indonesian criminal code and criminal procedure code fail in 
numerous respects to provide anti-corruption law enforcement the 
support it needs.  Many provisions critical to discovering and 
investigating the networks of corruption that permeate the 
government bureaucracy, such as undercover operations, the 
obtaining of bank records, and the use of immunity and sentence 
reduction agreements in exchange for testimony, are missing 
entirely.98 
In fact, Indonesia’s narrow and rigid evidence rules 
affirmatively impede effective anti-corruption investigation and 
deter prosecutors from building a case on evidence derived 
through modern techniques.  Under the Indonesian procedure 
code, only five types of evidence are considered legally valid 
means of proof at trial.99  They are: (1) testimony of a witness; (2) 
 
94 New offenses included unjust enrichment by public officials at the expense 
of the state, and bribery of civil servants. Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication 
of Corruption Offences, arts. 3, 13 (Indon.).  For provisions increasing penalties, 
see id. arts. 5–12. 
95 Id. arts. 18, 20.  A 2001 amendment to the 1999 act elaborated and 
expanded on the offenses created in the earlier law.  See Law Number 20 of 2001, 
Amendment to Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offenses 
arts. 5 (bribing a civil servant), 6 (corruptly influencing a judge), 7 (government 
procurement fraud), 8 (embezzlement by a civil servant), 9 (falsifying official 
books and records), 10 (destruction of public records), 11 (gratuities to civil 
servants), 12 (other corrupt acts by civil servants) (Indon.). 
96 Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offences, arts. 21–22 
(Indon.). 
97  Law Number 15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, as 
amended by Law Number 25 of 2003 (Indon.). 
98 See infra Section 4. 
99 Prosecutors in Indonesia draft extremely detailed indictments which 
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testimony of an expert; (3) a “document,” which is somewhat 
narrowly defined to consist of public records, written testimony, or 
other documents which have a connection to the contents of 
another means of proof; (4) an “indication,” that is, testimony or 
documentary evidence of an act that tends to establish that an 
offense has occurred or the identity of the perpetrator; and (5) 
testimony of the defendant.100  To secure a conviction, there must 
be testimony from at least two witnesses or evidence in at least two 
of the five categories of proof.101  Evidence that does not fit within 
the parameters of the five statutorily defined types of legally 
cognizable proof is nugatory, regardless of its relevance or 
reliability.102  The rules do not expressly contemplate the admission 
of undercover audio or video tapes, for example, or the admission 
of electronic evidence, both of which may be crucial in corruption 
prosecutions.103 
 
summarize the police dossier that describes the investigation and the evidence 
against the defendant.  As in many civil law countries, the dossier plays a central 
role in Indonesian criminal procedure since it is the primary basis on which the 
judge, the key participant in the process, performs his inquisitorial function.  See 
Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of 
Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 1, 14 (2004) (“In the inquisitorial system, a written dossier is the backbone of 
the whole process and one of its main case-management tools, from the first stage 
of the proceeding in which the police intervene, to the phase of appeals against 
the verdict.”).  Trials are held before panels of three judges.  The head judge takes 
the lead in examining the defendant and other witnesses.  Indonesian Criminal 
Procedure Code arts. 153, 159 & 163 (Indon.).  Prosecutors may also examine, at 
the discretion of the judge.  Id. art. 164(2).  The prosecution has the burden of 
proof, and the judge is prohibited from making statements during the trial 
indicating his view of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Id. arts. 66, 158.  
Defendants have the right to counsel, the right to compel the attendance of 
witnesses, and the right to a public trial, but there is no right equivalent to the 
American right against self-incrimination.  Id. arts. 64, 65, 69–74.  Defendants, 
therefore, nearly always testify at their trials. 
100 Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code arts. 184, 185–189 (Indon.). 
101 Id. art. 185(2)–(3). 
102 Recognizing the inflexibility of this approach, a drafting committee of 
legal experts is now working on draft revisions to the Criminal Procedure Code 
which would, among other things, expand the scope of admissible evidence, and 
define admissibility by reference to relevance rather than the narrow categories.  
See generally Strang, supra note 55. 
103 In a few recent laws relating to specific crimes, additional provisions have 
been added which slightly broaden the scope of legal evidence.  Electronic 
communications evidence is admissible in money laundering cases, for example, 
and the 2001 amendments to the 1999 corruption law also made electronic 
communications evidence admissible in many corruption cases.  See Law Number 
15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, as amended by Law 
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Because Indonesia follows the continental civil code system, in 
which all legal authority flows from statutes, the opinion of one 
court as to the proper interpretation of an evidence rule has no 
utility as legal precedent and therefore is of limited predictive 
value in assessing the position of other courts on the same 
question.  Thus, even with rulings as to admissibility in one trial, 
prosecutors cannot be secure that they will be able to use the same 
type of evidence in a subsequent trial before a different set of 
judges.  A recent decision by the Constitutional Court, which ruled 
that the use of wiretaps by law enforcement must be specifically 
regulated by law, reinforces this point.104  Without express 
authorization to engage in a particular investigative technique, and 
a basis to admit the resulting evidence through the narrow avenues 
of the Indonesian procedure code, law enforcement is 
understandably reluctant to use it, even if it would be the most 
effective way to build a case.  Instead, Indonesian investigators 
continue to rely on suspect interrogation as their primary 
evidence-gathering technique, which means that investigations are 
historical and focused on the single target identified, rather than 
penetrating into an ongoing corruption network, with the potential 
to catch multiple perpetrators engaged in numerous criminal acts 
over a period of time. 
The UNCAC supports the notion that procedural reform is 
critical to an effective law-enforcement regime, and the Indonesian 
legislature has taken a few limited steps in that direction.  The 2002 
law which formed the KPK created a few new procedures and 
conferred authority on the KPK to use some additional 
investigative techniques,105 but the statutory provisions describing 
 
Number 25 of 2003, art. 38(b) (Indon.) (permitting electronic evidence to be 
admitted in money laundering cases); Law Number 20 of 2001 Concerning the 
Law of Criminal Procedure, art. 26(A) (Indon.) (permitting electronic evidence to 
serve as the basis of an “indication” under the Criminal Procedure Code).  None  
 
of those laws expressly authorize the admission of undercover audio or video 
tapes. 
104 Mulyana Wirakusumah et al. v. Indonesia, Constitutional Court Decision 
No. 012-016-019/PUU-IV/2006 (Dec. 18, 2006) (Indon.) (ruling that the police 
need express authorization for the use of undercover contacts, in which one party 
to a conversation consents to police monitoring, and illustrating Indonesia’s strict 
oversight of law enforcement). 
105 See, e.g. Law Number 30 of 2002 of the Commission for the Eradication of 
Criminal Acts of Corruption, art. 12 (Indon.) (granting authority to KPK to use 
wiretaps, to ban persons from traveling abroad, to request financial and tax 
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these procedures are not well-developed, leaving substantial 
ambiguities as to what the KPK is authorized to do, and how it can 
do it.106  Even more importantly, the law applies only to the 100 or 
so investigators and prosecutors in the Jakarta-based KPK, and so 
is of no assistance to the thousands of prosecutors with the AGO, 
who will necessarily handle most of Indonesia’s corruption and 
related prosecutions across the country’s vast expanse.107 
It is not clear that forces pressing for broad anti-corruption 
reform, or even those with the enforcement objective as a priority, 
recognize how important it is to the overall corruption-reduction 
goal to enact laws supporting the national law enforcement’s 
evidence-gathering infrastructure.  Despite its centrality to 
effective anti-corruption enforcement, criminal procedure is a 
somewhat arcane subject, not well understood outside criminal 
justice circles.  Even within criminal justice institutions, because of 
the many limitations of the current system, we found that 
investigators and prosecutors in Indonesia have little experience 
designing comprehensive investigatory strategies or implementing 
numerous and complimentary evidence-gathering techniques in 
 
records); id. art. 15 (obliging KPK to protect witnesses and whistleblowers). 
106 As noted in the text, under the civil law system a decision by one judge 
about the use by law enforcement of a particular statutory mechanism is of 
limited predictive value concerning how other judges might treat the same 
question.  Ambiguity in the statute, therefore, can paralyze law enforcement, a 
situation only rectified with new legislation.  While the KPK has been successful 
in recent cases in introducing intercepted conversations into evidence through its 
wiretap authority, this authority does not extend to consensually monitored 
(undercover) contacts, or to other investigative agencies. 
107 The KPK is based in the capital city of Jakarta, and it has no physical 
presence in the rest of the sprawling archipelago.  At the end of 2006, the KPK had 
fewer than 100 investigators and prosecutors.  KPK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
69, at 3.6 (showing figures for employees in the “Repression Unit”).  Moreover, 
the KPK’s authority is specifically restricted to cases involving significant state 
losses, law enforcement, or other high government officials, and cases which have 
otherwise achieved widespread notoriety.  Law Number 30 of 2002, Commission 
for the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption, art. 11 (Indon.).  By contrast, 
Indonesia’s prosecution service has at least 5600 prosecutors stationed in dozens 
of offices around the country.  See PWC & BIICL REPORT, supra note 50, at 49 
(discussing the total number of public prosecution services throughout 
Indonesia).  Its mandate is not limited to large corruption cases, but can include 
money laundering and other related crimes.  Only the prosecution service, which 
is represented in every province and has access to local witnesses and evidence, 
can reach corruption by judges, governors, mayors, local legislators, police 
officers, tax collectors, customs officials, and the petty but entrenched corruption 
in various administrative bureaucracies across the republic which directly affects 
the lives of Indonesian citizens. 
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compiling a case, both of which are crucial to effectively 
prosecuting a public corruption case.  A recent report produced by 
the KPK, which identified gaps between Indonesian law and the 
UNCAC’s directives as a prelude to legislative reform, overlooks 
several of the critical criminal procedure law deficiencies.108  This 
pattern of neglecting legal reforms that enhance law enforcement’s 
ability to actually investigate and prosecute corruption cases is 
likely to be common in developing nations that most need reform. 
3. ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE ANTI-CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT 
3.1. The Need for a Proactive Investigatory Strategy 
Public corruption crimes pose unique evidence-gathering 
challenges to law enforcement everywhere.  Unlike many other 
crimes, crimes of corruption are carried out in secret.  The essence 
of the crime is a covert deal struck by two satisfied parties who 
have no incentive to report it, with no independent witnesses.109  
Its means are outwardly unremarkable—typical dealings between 
businesses or members of the public with individuals in their 
official capacities, which become suspicious only when viewed 
with a sophisticated eye as part of a scheme of corrupt activity.  
 
108 The KPK’s 2006 report on the gaps in Indonesian law compared to the 
UNCAC consists of a thoughtful 52-page report and an attached matrix.  KPK GAP 
ANALYSIS, supra note 7.  While it discusses nearly every major article in the 
UNCAC and the need for conforming Indonesian laws, the absence of any useful 
discussion of either investigative techniques including undercover operations, as 
called for in UNCAC art. 50(1), or immunity and sentence reduction mechanisms, 
as called for in UNCAC art. 37, is surprising, since these are two of the most 
critical law enforcement tools for investigating corruption.  The omission is likely 
attributable to the fact that the authors, a group of lawyers and consultants from 
Indonesia and a governance think tank based in Switzerland, were all from civil 
law countries which have little experience with such tools, and whom appear to 
have had relatively little prosecutorial experience.  Id. at Annex II.  See also Basel 
Institute on Governance, Homepage, http://www.baselgovernance.org (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2008) (describing the form and function of the Basel Institute on 
Governance, a Swiss non-profit think tank that worked on the KPK’s 2006 report). 
109  See Tony KWOK Man-wai, Investigating Corruption, in United Nations 
Asia & Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders 
[UNAFEI], Annual Report for 2005 & Resource Material Series No. 69, at 191 (July 
2006), available at http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms_all/no69.pdf  
(listing difficulties of investigating corruption gleaned from the author’s 
experience working within Hong Kong’s independent corruption commission).  
Participants in corrupt networks are often linked by professional, ethnic or 
regional ties of loyalty.   
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The results—official influence or benefits indirectly delivered—are 
not readily apparent.  There is no crime scene to study, no victim to 
interview, no fingerprints or trace evidence to examine.  Financial 
documents, which form a primary source of evidence, are often 
protected by law or difficult to obtain, and require resources and 
expertise to decipher.  Witnesses are likely complicit or concerned 
about retaliation from superiors if they file a report.110  
Perpetrators, especially of high-level corruption, are often savvy 
politicians, business people and financiers who understand how to 
bury the evidence of their misdeeds, and have the connections and 
means to call on other professionals—lawyers, accountants, 
computer experts—to help execute the deed and launder the 
proceeds.111  These criminals, with their hired help, can take 
advantage of jurisdictional boundaries and identify loopholes that 
hide their activities.112 
They may be in a position to influence public opinion, threaten 
the careers of investigators or prosecutors, interfere with the 
investigation, or prolong the proceedings through various 
tactics.113  All of these factors may drain the will of dedicated 
investigators and prosecutors, and the public support on which 
they depend.114 
The primary investigative technique employed in many civil 
law countries and across much of the developing world—long, 
detailed interrogation of suspects—is often ineffective in meeting 
the challenges that public corruption investigations present.  
 
110 See Johnston & Doig, supra note 10, at 14 (“Organized corruption closes off 
clients’ political or bureaucratic alternatives, giving the organization more corrupt 
leverage” and “creates a network of operatives sharing not only rewards but also 
risks; they thus have a stake in protecting corruption, increasing its proceeds, and 
freezing out critics and holdout agents and clients.”). 
111 See ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, supra note 27, 
at 2 (“High-level corruption mobilizes extensive resources to camouflage ‘levies,’ 
‘commissions,’ and ‘kickbacks’ and to transfer the acquired assets to safe financial 
havens.”). 
112 Man-wai, supra note 109, at 191. 
113 See, e.g., U.N. Dev. Programme Report, supra note 9, at 50–51 (describing 
the belief of a former anti-corruption prosecutor in Fiji that political interference, 
delay, and threats directed at prosecutors undermined a major corruption 
prosecution). 
114 ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, supra note 27, at 
2–3 (“Rather than being able to conduct their investigations as they themselves see 
fit, [law enforcement agencies which investigate  high-level corruption cases] are 
often obliged to follow orders from superiors who are close to the political power 
structure and might try to influence the course of prosecution.”). 
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Perpetrators alerted to an investigation proceeding by means of 
interrogation usually have ample time to coordinate their stories 
and to destroy or remove evidence.  The essence of public 
corruption is deceit, so lying to investigators is the norm, not the 
exception.  And without financial documents, recorded statements, 
or other evidence with which to confront suspects, who are often 
powerful individuals and well represented by counsel, prying 
loose admissions is an uphill struggle.  Interrogation oriented 
toward discovering evidence of past acts is a poor tool to penetrate 
a corrupt relationship, or web of relationships, which is usually 
still vital at the time of the investigation.  Effective investigation 
and prosecution of corruption requires a more proactive evidence-
gathering strategy geared to the stealth, complexity, and ongoing, 
interrelated nature of the crime. 
An effective public corruption investigatory strategy has many 
parallels to that employed in the investigation of organized crime.  
First, rooting out corruption, like dismantling organized crime 
syndicates, requires a strategy that penetrates the association of 
criminals in order to gather information from the inside.  It is the 
secret agreement between the participants to engage in a certain 
transaction or series of transactions, such as when an elected 
official agrees to trade his vote for private financial gain, which 
constitutes the crime.  Evidence of the relationship between the 
participants itself lays the foundation for the prosecution’s theory 
of the crime, and evidence of communications between the 
participants in the course of implementing the criminal scheme 
supplies the direct proof of motive, intent, and implementation 
that is often at the core of a public corruption case.  Such 
communications may be contemporaneous with the investigation, 
and captured on audio or videotape with the help of an informant 
or undercover investigator, or may be historical, as recounted from 
the witness stand by a whistleblower or a participant who has 
subsequently agreed to testify for the prosecution.  In either 
scenario, the standard approach is to start near the bottom of the 
organization and work up the chain of command.  In prosecutors’ 
parlance, lower level participants are “flipped” or “rolled” to 
provide evidence against higher level participants in the scheme. 
Second, as Deep Throat famously instructed Bob Woodward 
and Carl Bernstein, in corruption cases, as in organized crime 
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cases, investigators must “follow the money.”115  Money is the 
lifeblood of corrupt networks, just as it is with criminal 
enterprises.116  Both exist primarily in order to extract a profit from 
illicit activities.  In cases of entrenched bureaucratic corruption, 
proceeds flow upward from lower level participants to higher level 
figures just as they do in an organized crime enterprise.  Since 
proving receipt of the money (or some similarly valuable benefit) is 
the key to proving the crime, a failure to follow the money is 
usually fatal to a corruption prosecution—like a murder case 
without a body or a weapon. 
Third, law enforcement must be able to secure the cooperation 
of witnesses with knowledge of the crime.  Without witnesses who 
can testify at a public trial, there can be no prosecution.  In 
corruption cases, as in organized crime cases, witnesses who can 
provide direct evidence of the crime generally have no incentive to 
report it or fear the consequences of coming forward.  These 
consequences may include threats, harassment, workplace or 
professional retaliation, economic and social isolation by other 
members of the witness’ industry, business or social group, and in 
many countries, violent retribution. 
To most experienced public corruption prosecutors, the 
importance of these strategies is readily apparent.  Following a 
2003 international conference on the effective prosecution of 
corruption cases in Asia and the Pacific, conference organizers 
reported the key findings of the conference to be that corruption 
suspects continue to benefit from banking secrecy laws and the 
lack of whistleblower protection laws to encourage reporting.  
Nevertheless, they reported, “[t]he strategies of ‘starting at a low 
level, and working one’s way up’ and ‘following the money’ have 
proven particularly efficient even in corruption cases involving 
high-ranking, influential perpetrators and international 
transactions.”117 
 
115 ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Warner Bros. Pictures 1976). 
116 See Bruce G. Ohr, Effective Methods to Combat Transnational Organized Crime 
in Criminal Justice Processes, in United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders [UNAFEI], Resource 
Material Series No. 58, 40, 55 (Dec. 2001),  available at http://www.unafei.or.jp 
/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no58/58-05.pdf (“It cannot be overstated that making 
money is the primary goal of organized crime and transnational criminal 
activities.”). 
117 ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, supra note 27, at 
xii. 
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3.2. Key Investigative Tools and Techniques 
Proactive corruption investigation requires tools and 
techniques that permit investigators to “get inside” the corrupt 
networks, “follow the money,” and secure trial witnesses and other 
evidence.  These include both laws that authorize law enforcement 
activities that facilitate evidence-gathering, and laws that allow 
prosecutors to pursue criminal conduct that supports the criminal 
enterprise.  Long experience in the United States has proven the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms for attacking corruption.118  The 
key evidence-gathering tools are laws that (1) protect witnesses 
who offer evidence of the corruption crimes from workplace 
retaliation; (2) authorize undercover operations; (3) authorize 
access to financial documents, including bank records; and (4) 
establish mechanisms by which prosecutors can offer immunity or 
sentencing leniency to those who provide valuable evidence 
against others in a corrupt network.  Another key strategy is the 
targeting of associated criminal conduct.  Investigators and 
prosecutors in many other countries use similar tools, and the 
UNCAC encourages the adoption of each of these procedures. 
 
118 In comparing U.S. laws to those in Indonesia, we focus on federal criminal 
law and procedure rather than the laws of the fifty states.  This is partly out of 
convenience, since the laws of the states vary in detail, although many state laws 
and procedures are similar to the federal procedures discussed here.  It is also 
because, since at least the early 1970s, federal investigators and prosecutors have 
been a primary law enforcement weapon against public corruption, even at the 
state and local level, and there is therefore a long and tested track record of the 
use of federal criminal laws and procedures in the area of corruption eradication. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS 
OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2006, at 44–46 tbls.1 & 2, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/arpt-2006.pdf (showing that 407 
federal officials and 241 local officials were convicted on federal corruption 
charges in 2006, and presenting data for multiple years); see also Charles F. C. Ruff, 
Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law 
Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1171–72 (1977) (discussing federal 
prosecutors’ decision whether to retain jurisdiction or hand a case over to the local 
authorities when the case involves violations of both federal and state laws); Sara 
Sun Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal Government’s Authority to Prosecute 
Federal Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising Conclusions and a 
Proposal, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 699–700 (2000) (discussing federal prosecutors’ use 
of federal statutes to prosecute state and local government officials for 
corruption). 
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3.2.1. Whistleblower Protection Laws 
A specific form of witness interference particularly relevant to 
public corruption cases is workplace retaliation against those who 
report corruption or fraud that comes to their attention in the 
course of their employment.  Protecting “whistleblowers” and 
thereby encouraging them to come forward is critical to effective 
detection of public corruption.119  These persons often provide the 
initial lead for investigators, and may subsequently become 
undercover informants or important trial witnesses for the 
prosecution.  As noted above, public corruption, such as 
corruption involving the misuse of public resources, often involves 
a small circle of participants and conduct that is carried out away 
from public view.  Employees who observe criminal conduct in the 
workplace by colleagues and superiors are uniquely situated to 
expose that conduct and to assist investigators, but they are also 
uniquely vulnerable to workplace retaliation and harassment.  The 
assurance of legal protection against retaliation is an important 
factor in promoting disclosure of corrupt activity and preventing 
efforts to cover up the crime or interfere with the reporting party’s 
efforts to assist law enforcement.120  Article 33 of the UNCAC urges  
 
119 In 2001, a whistleblower in the California Commissioner of Insurance’s 
Office revealed information that led to the resignation of the Commissioner and 
the prosecution of persons associated with the embezzlement and diversion of 
public funds in the Commissioner’s office.  See State Bar Exonerates Quackenbush 
Whistleblower, CAL. B.J., Jan. 2001, available at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/2cbj 
/01jan/page24-1.htm (noting that leaking of confidential client information by 
state attorney whistleblower was not considered unethical conduct because it was 
protected by California’s whistleblower law). 
120 At least three federal whistleblower protection statutes are expressly 
dedicated to the protection of persons who report potential criminal activity.  One 
provision, enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, makes it a crime punishable 
by up to ten years to retaliate against whistleblowers who provide information to 
law enforcement relating to the possible commission of a federal offense.  18 
U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2006).  Another provision of the Act provides for restraining 
orders to prevent retaliation against whistleblowers, and another allows 
whistleblowers to recover compensatory damages and other remedies for 
persecution.  Id. §§ 1514, 5328.  A plethora of other federal, state, and local laws 
provide whistleblower protection.  Some federal whistleblower laws apply to 
categories of government employees, such as federal employees generally.  
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)–(b)(9) (2006).  Others apply 
specifically to military employees, military contract workers, members of the 
Coast Guard, and foreign service employees: Military Whistleblower Protection 
Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1034(b) (2006); Contractor Employees of the Armed Forces Act, 10 
U.S.C § 2409 (2006); Protection of Seamen Against Discrimination Act, 46 U.S.C § 
2114 (2006); and the Foreign Service Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3905(b)(2) (2006).  Other laws 
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parties to enact laws providing “protection against any unjustified 
treatment” for whistleblowers.121 
Typically, whistleblower protection laws prohibit workplace 
retaliation such as termination, suspension, demotion, or 
discriminatory treatment, on account of the employee’s action in 
reporting suspected unlawful or unsafe conduct to a superior, or to 
an administrative, regulatory or investigative government agency.  
The protections may be enforced through civil or administrative 
remedies against the employer122 or through criminal sanctions.123 
3.2.2. Undercover Operations 
The term “undercover operation” covers a broad spectrum of 
covert investigative scenarios, from operations that may last for 
years, involving undercover agents infiltrating an organized 
criminal network, to a single telephone call between a cooperating 
witness and a target.124  In all cases, however, undercover activity 
 
protect private sector employees who report various types of unlawful acts or 
conditions.  E.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006); 
Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
1367 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2006).  All fifty states have enacted 
whistleblower protection statutes.  See National Conference of State Legislatures, 
State Whistleblower Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/employ 
/whistleblower.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).  Many local and municipal 
governments have also enacted such laws. 
121 UNODC, supra note 31, at 120, 146. 
122 Remedies may include reinstatement, back pay with interest, costs, 
damages, attorney fees, and other measures. 
123 In cases of retaliation against whistleblowers in a criminal investigation, of 
course, there may also be criminal sanctions under obstruction of justice laws.  
Such laws cover threats and harassment of potential witnesses, which could 
include workplace retaliation.  See infra notes 148–51 and accompanying text. 
124 Ohr, supra note 116, at 48.  In the United States, there is no single statute 
which sets forth the nature and scope of law enforcement authority to conduct 
undercover operations.  The use of undercover strategies, and the admissibility 
into evidence of statements of the defendant captured on audio or videotape, has 
become a well-established feature of American criminal law.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
2511(2)(c) (2000) (stating that it is not unlawful “for a person acting under color of 
law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a 
party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given 
prior consent to such interception.”); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) 
(admitting testimony of governmental agents regarding conversation they 
overheard via a radio transmitter carried by an informant).  Some criminal 
statutes, such as the “sting money laundering” provision in section 1956(a)(3) of 
Title 18, specifically contemplate undercover operations. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) 
(2000). 
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involves monitored communication between a law enforcement 
officer or a person acting at the direction of law enforcement, and a 
person suspected of engaging in criminal activity.125  Undercover 
operations are generally used to gather firsthand information from 
the targets about their involvement in past or future offenses, or 
about a crime while it is underway.  The term includes what are 
commonly called “sting” operations, in which members of law 
enforcement offer the target an opportunity to commit a crime, 
intending to gather evidence of the defendant’s attempt to do so.  
Another undercover tactic is a “controlled delivery” in which a 
prearranged delivery of money or contraband is made to the 
suspect in a monitored setting, after which the suspect is arrested. 
Sometimes such operations involve a law enforcement agent 
going undercover, that is, using an assumed identity for purposes 
of the operation.  At other times, an informant or cooperating 
witness is used, who takes direction from law enforcement.  In all 
undercover operations, law enforcement aspires to record the 
targets themselves as they discuss, plan, or implement criminal 
behavior.126  UNCAC’s article 50(1) requires that parties shall, to 
the extent permitted by domestic law, take measures to permit the 
use by appropriate authorities of controlled delivery operations, 
electronic surveillance, and undercover operations, “and to allow 
for the admissibility in court of evidence derived therefrom.”127 
 
125 Undercover operations, therefore, are distinct from activities involving the 
interception of communications between persons where no participant in the 
communications has consented to monitoring by law enforcement.  That type of 
evidence gathering, commonly called a wire tap, requires court authorization, and 
is a more cumbersome investigative tool, used with far less frequency in public 
corruption investigations.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516–22. 
126 See, e.g., United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1071, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 
1991) (discussing evidence of $3,000 bribe paid by undercover FBI agent to State 
Senator); see also Allan Lengel, FBI Says Jefferson Was Filmed Taking Cash: Affidavit 
Details Sting on Lawmaker, WASH. POST, May 22, 2006, at A1 (discussing 
investigation of Congressman William J. Jefferson, who was filmed taking a 
briefcase with $100,000 from a person who was cooperating with the FBI); Dan 
Eggen, Alaska Senator’s Calls Were Secretly Taped, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2007, at A10 
(discussing an Alaska corruption investigation and an oil industry figure’s role in 
recording calls with various elected officials). 
127 UNODC, supra note 31, at 210. In its legislative guide, the U.N. Office of 
Drugs and Crime observes that “[t]hese techniques are especially useful in dealing 
with sophisticated organized criminal groups because of the dangers and 
difficulties inherent in gaining access to their operations and gathering 
information and evidence for use in domestic prosecutions,” and that less 
intrusive methods will often not prove effective.  Id. at 211. 
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Of course, the conduct of undercover operations by law 
enforcement raises serious questions of inducement, intent, and 
interference with individual rights.  Both substantive128 and 
procedural protections129 are necessary to cabin the use of this 
powerful investigative technique to appropriate boundaries.  But 
when gathered under supervised conditions, evidence from 
 
128 In the United States, legal doctrines that have emerged through case law 
in the course of the development of undercover investigations have also served to 
define the boundaries of appropriate undercover operations.  Constitutional 
individual rights define the limits to law enforcement conduct.  Additionally, a 
common defense raised in “sting” cases, in which law enforcement facilitates the 
defendant’s conduct in attempting to commit a crime in the course of the 
monitored communications, is entrapment.  Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 
540 (1992) (finding entrapment where defendant, charged with purchasing child 
pornography, had been targeted by law enforcement agents who had mailed 
dozens of solicitations to the defendant offering to sell child pornography).  Under 
federal law, law enforcement may “afford opportunities or facilities for the 
commission of the offense.”  Id. at 548.  But entrapment is a valid defense where it 
can be shown that the government agent induced an innocent person to commit a 
crime.  See id. at 542 (reversing conviction “[b]ecause the Government overstepped 
the line between setting a trap for the ‘unwary innocent’ and the ‘unwary 
criminal’”).  An informant who pushes too hard, or who essentially hounds an 
innocent target until the target ultimately agrees to a criminal course of action, 
will be found to have entrapped the target.  An entrapment defense is defeated, 
however, if it can be shown either that the defendant was already disposed to 
commit the crime prior to being contacted by the government agent, or that the 
government agent did not induce him to commit the crime.  Accordingly, most 
law enforcement agencies will not authorize an undercover operation unless there 
is sufficient “predication,” that is, a documented, pre-existing basis to believe that 
the target has already committed, or is willing to commit, a particular type of 
crime.  Under federal law, where a defendant is predisposed to commit the crime, 
there can be no valid entrapment defense.  Such basis could be established by 
evidence of similar prior conduct by the target, or reliable reports about the 
target’s current activities.  Predication serves to ensure both that the target 
selection is based on factual criteria and not arbitrary or irrelevant factors, and 
that a defense of entrapment is unlikely to succeed. 
129 These may include intra-agency rules as to how to conduct undercover 
operations to ensure they are consistent with constitutional rights and 
requirements that instigation of undercover operations be approved by a 
coordinating entity.  The FBI, for example, requires approval from a federal 
prosecutor before an agent may authorize the recording of any conversations 
involving informants, and undercover operations are subject to careful review.  
See JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf.  In addition, the U.S. Department 
of Justice requires written authorization from the Office of Enforcement 
Operations in the Criminal Division in Washington before certain types of in-
person contacts may be monitored.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEY MANUAL §9-7.302, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa 
/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/7mcrm.htm#9-7.302. 
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undercover operations often provides the most compelling 
evidence of a defendant’s guilt.  Such evidence portrays the 
defendant himself, in his own words, without the benefit of 
coaching, the filter of a witness’s memory, or the spin of an 
attorney’s argument.  Video or audio tapes that capture the 
defendant’s quotidian behavior in his own office, home, or car, 
have an authenticity and immediacy that no other type of evidence 
can match.  Public corruption prosecutions are often built around 
undercover evidence, and it may be the high point of the 
government’s presentation at trial.  Defendants in public 
corruption cases often argue that they lacked corrupt intent, that 
their words were misinterpreted, or that the prosecution is 
motivated by extraneous factors.  A videotape of an official 
pocketing cash from an undercover agent, however, or a recorded 
telephone call in which the defendant promises to exercise his 
influence in exchange for money, can be extremely powerful 
evidence that sweeps such defenses away.130 
Undercover operations provide a powerful investigative 
advantage, allowing law enforcement to get inside a network of 
criminal players and gather evidence over time.  A standard 
feature of corruption investigations is the introduction of an 
undercover agent or informant who conducts extensive 
undercover activity with numerous targets.  Such investigations 
typically start with a small number of identified targets as to whom 
there is predication—that is, a basis for suspecting those targets’ 
involvement in corrupt activity.  More targets may be added to the 
investigation as the undercover agent is introduced to additional 
participants or referred to other persons involved in similar 
criminal activity.  Likewise, those who are approached and who 
emphatically decline an opportunity to participate in corrupt 
conduct are dropped as targets.  The undercover operation may 
continue for as long as it can still effectively gather evidence of 
criminal corruption.  While the undercover operation is underway, 
law enforcement agents may take other investigative measures that 
do not endanger the undercover operation, such as surveillance or 
 
130 As a matter of evidence, a defendant’s statements, if relevant, are always 
admissible in federal criminal trials.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).  A statement by a 
defendant’s agent is also admissible.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C)–(D).  Statements of 
co-conspirators, made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, are also 
admissible.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).  These rules give ample room for the use of 
evidence gathered in undercover operations. 
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obtaining grand jury subpoenas for bank account records.  At some 
point, when the operation has run its course (or is in danger of 
being exposed), investigators and prosecutors will plan a “take-
down,” a coordinated operation that usually involves the execution 
of multiple arrest warrants and search warrants.  At that point, the 
“covert” stage of the investigation is over, and the “overt” stage 
begins, during which prosecutors may interview witnesses, obtain  
 
official records, and gather other evidence necessary to make the 
case. 
3.2.3. Access to Financial Records 
Access to bank account and other financial records is another 
critical aspect of corruption investigations.  In the United States, 
federal investigators and prosecutors have ready access to financial 
records through the use of subpoenas issued through an 
investigating grand jury.131  The heart of almost any public 
corruption case is the pecuniary benefit flowing to the corrupt 
official.  If the benefit can be documented in the hands of the 
official, the case is half won.  Conversely, if the flow of the money 
to the defendant or his family or associates cannot be tracked and 
then proven at trial, a public corruption prosecution has little 
prospect of success.  The UNCAC, article 40, takes specific aim at 
the barrier that bank secrecy laws can pose to the investigation and 
prosecution of public corruption.  The article states simply that 
parties to the Convention “shall ensure that, in the case of domestic 
criminal investigations of offenses established in accordance with 
this Convention, there are appropriate mechanisms available 
within its domestic legal system to overcome obstacles that may 
arise out of the application of bank secrecy laws.”132 
Bank records are often obtained at the outset of an 
 
131 The grand jury, an outgrowth of medieval English law, is an unusual 
feature of U.S. criminal procedure with few parallels in other countries.  The 
federal government and several states still rely on grand juries as an integral part 
of the system for investigating and charging felony offenses.  In its modern form 
under federal law, grand juries in each federal district consist of between sixteen 
and twenty-three persons selected from the public, who meet periodically to hear 
testimony, issue subpoenas, and vote on indictments.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. 
132 UNODC, supra note 31, at 123.  The Legislative Guide notes that the 
Article is intended to address the inability of investigators to access financial 
records, a “major hurdle” to the investigation of crimes with financial aspects.  Id. 
at 153. 
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investigation to corroborate information from a whistleblower or 
other informant, or to provide predication for an undercover 
operation.  During the covert stage of an investigation, bank 
accounts related to persons who receive money from an 
undercover agent may be subpoenaed in order to help track the 
movement of the money, or to help identify other persons who 
have made payments to the same person.  Later in an investigation, 
bank records may establish probable cause for a search warrant.  
Once the investigation is overt, witnesses may be required to 
produce bank records or other documents relating to the financial 
activity that is the focus of the investigation.  Analysis of records 
for one bank account often points to other accounts or businesses, 
as incoming deposits or outgoing checks or transfers draw the 
attention of investigators and prosecutors.  Such an analysis may 
also lead to the identification of additional conspirators, the 
location of assets purchased with proceeds of the offense, or to the 
development of prosecution theories based on anti-money 
laundering laws.  In a lengthy investigation, the relatively prompt 
production of business records by banks, credit card companies, 
escrow companies, retail establishments, and similar businesses is 
often what drives the investigation forward. 
Many countries, including Indonesia, have enacted laws 
requiring public officials to disclose assets or certain 
transactions.133  Many countries have also criminalized illicit 
enrichment, that is, the “significant increase in the assets of a 
public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation 
to his or her lawful income.”134  Investigation of this crime, clearly, 
 
133 UNCAC, supra note 28, art. 8(4) (“Each State Party shall also consider, in 
accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, establishing 
measures and systems to facilitate the reporting by public officials of acts of 
corruption to appropriate authorities, when such acts come to their notice in the 
performance of their functions.”); Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 13(a) (Indon.) 
(authorizing the KPK to construct lists and conduct checks on reports on the 
wealth of government executives); Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 16 (Indon.) 
(requiring civil servants and government officials to report any gratification they 
have received); Law Number 28 of 1999 on a Corruption-free State 
Administration, art. 5 (Indon.); see KPK GAP REPORT, supra note 7 (noting that 
Japan, Korea and Thailand have laws which only require high level officials to 
report their assets, while Belgium, Nepal and the Philippines extend the reporting 
duties to the families and relatives of public officials). 
134 UNCAC, supra note 28, art. 20. See UNODC, supra note 31, at 103 & 103 n. 
56 (noting that several jurisdictions have found such a statute to be helpful, 
including France, Kenya and the Netherlands).  Such statutes are particularly 
powerful in combination with burden shifting laws, such as one in Indonesia, 
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cannot even begin without effective access to bank records and 
other documents relating to assets, in order to allow investigators 
and prosecutors to gauge a public official’s wealth. 
Bank records or other records of financial transactions are often 
the key documents presented in evidence at trial in a public 
corruption prosecution.  Such documents may provide details 
about the possession and movement of money on specific dates, 
information that is key to proving most corruption charges.  Bank 
account records, or records of normal real estate or other financial 
transactions, are largely unassailable as evidence; as documents 
created in the normal course of business, their accuracy is usually 
undisputed.  Because business records don’t lie, they provide ideal 
corroboration to the testimony of an informant, whose motives, 
veracity, or recollection of events will be vigorously challenged by 
defense attorneys. 
3.2.4. Immunity and Sentence Reduction Mechanisms 
As with dismantling crime syndicates, a key strategy in 
exposing and eradicating hidden networks of corruption is to turn 
one participant in the enterprise against others.  Prosecutors 
generally start with lower level figures and work “up the chain,” 
offering inducements—either immunity or sentence reduction—to 
the underlings to produce evidence that will incriminate the critical 
players. 
The legal authority to grant immunity in exchange for a 
witness’s sworn testimony is a valuable tool in executing this 
strategy.  Under the United States model, a prosecutor may seek a 
court order compelling a witness to testify, and granting that 
witness “use” immunity for his testimony, meaning that the 
government cannot use the evidence he provides against him in a 
subsequent trial.135  Failure to testify once an immunity order is 
issued can lead to civil or criminal contempt-of-court charges.136 
 
which shifts to the public official the duty to disclose legitimate sources of wealth.  
Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 48 (Indon.). 
135 In obtaining Department of Justice approval to offer a witness immunity, 
federal prosecutors must demonstrate that (1) “the testimony or other information 
from such individual may be necessary to the public interest” and (2) the 
individual “has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other 
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.”  18 U.S.C. § 
6003(b). 
136 A less formal mechanism for inducing cooperation frequently used early 
in a federal investigation with respect to persons who had minimal involvement 
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A more common tool by which U.S. prosecutors secure the 
testimony of “insiders” in public corruption cases is a cooperation 
agreement.  Cooperation agreements are usually negotiated as part 
of a plea bargain, in which the defendant is required to admit guilt 
to one or more criminal offenses, and to incur some type of 
criminal liability.  As part of the agreement, the defendant agrees 
to fully and truthfully cooperate with the prosecution, including 
disclosing information and providing testimony in court.  If the 
defendant provides truthful and substantial cooperation, the 
prosecutor agrees to file a motion at the time of sentencing 
requesting that the judge reduce the defendant’s sentence to reflect 
the nature and value of the defendant’s cooperation.137 
The Convention endorses the use of both sentence reduction 
mechanisms and grants of immunity in corruption cases to induce 
the cooperation of participants in the crime.  Article 37(1) requires 
that states “take appropriate measures to encourage persons who 
participate or have participated” in corruption offenses “to supply 
information useful to competent authorities for investigative and 
evidentiary purposes,” and to provide other factual help.138  Article 
37 then goes on to specifically urge states to enact measures 
 
in the criminal activity, is a “non-target” letter.  A “non-target” letter is simply a 
letter provided by a prosecutor to a potential witness (or the witness’s attorney), 
assuring the witness that, based on information currently in the prosecutor’s 
possession, the witness is not considered a “target” of the investigation.  A 
“target” is someone whom the prosecutor believes has committed a criminal act, 
and as to whom the prosecutor believes he will have sufficient evidence to charge 
with a crime.  In cases involving many participants, witnesses with some 
knowledge of the crime, however minor or innocent, may be reluctant to 
cooperate with law enforcement for fear of becoming ensnared in the prosecution.  
“Non-target” letters are extremely helpful in encouraging such witnesses to come 
forward with information.  This procedure is based on the concept of 
prosecutorial discretion, a concept well-developed in U.S. law, but which is 
largely non-existent in Indonesia and many other countries. 
137 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2007); Ohr, supra note 116, 
at 54.  See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Former Ney Aide Gets No Prison Time, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 16, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-08-16-ney-
corruption_N.htm (describing sentencing of William Heaton, a former aide to 
Congressman Robert Ney, who cooperated with investigators and taped 
telephone calls and a meeting with Ney); Karen Tumulty, The Plot Thickens, TIME, 
Dec. 5, 2005, at 40–41 (describing guilty plea of Michael Scanlon, former associate 
of Jack Abramoff, and Scanlon’s agreement to testify against Abramoff and Ney); 
Larry Welborn & Peggy Lowe, Jaramillo Cooperates with Feds Over Investigation, 
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Oct. 30, 2007, at B1 (describing assistant sheriff’s guilty 
plea and agreement to cooperate against his former boss, the elected county 
sheriff, who was subsequently indicted). 
138 UNODC, supra note 31, at 121, 149. 
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permitting “mitigating punishment of an accused person” and/or 
the “granting of immunity from prosecution to a person,” if the 
person “provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or 
prosecution” of corruption crimes.139 
The information provided by an immunized witness or 
cooperating defendant can be a tremendous evidence-gathering 
tool, both in strengthening the government’s case against known 
targets, or in initiating new investigations.  They may be asked to 
produce documents, lead investigators to other evidence, and if it 
is still feasible, they may be directed to make recorded telephone 
calls or to meet with other targets of the investigation and record 
those meetings.  The cooperation agreement mechanism not only 
yields valuable evidence, but gives prosecutors critical leverage 
within the criminal network.  Since a participant in a corrupt 
relationship is usually in a position to provide highly incriminating 
evidence against other participants, the knowledge that an 
“insider” is cooperating with the prosecution is often enough on its 
own to convince other defendants to plead guilty.  Because the first 
person to cooperate in an investigation often provides the most 
valuable information to investigators, that defendant often gets the 
largest reduction in sentence.  Thus, once an investigation becomes 
overt and the scope of the investigation becomes known, or after 
indictment, lesser targets or defendants often “race” to be the first 
one in the case to cooperate, cracking the corrupt network wide 
open. 
The concepts of conferring immunity on an individual with 
potential culpability, and of striking an agreement with a 
defendant to recommend a lesser sentence in exchange for 
testimony or other assistance, are foreign to the civil law tradition 
that includes Indonesia’s system.  Many civil law countries have 
introduced reforms in recent years which borrow and modify 
various features of the Anglo-American tradition, however.140  
Procedures for enlisting the assistance of criminal suspects or 
defendants through immunity or sentence reductions are among 
those concepts which have increasingly taken root in civil law 
countries.  Peru, one of the “French family” of civil law countries 
like Indonesia, adopted an immunity procedure for corruption 
 
139 Id.; UNCAC, supra note 28, arts. 37(2)–(3). 
140 Langer, supra note 99, at 39–62 (discussing emergence of various forms of 
plea bargaining in Germany, Italy, Argentina, and France). 
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cases which was later extended to other types of criminal cases.141  
Italy has a similar immunity and sentence reduction mechanism 
for kidnapping crimes.142  The Philippines, Nepal and Mongolia 
have provisions which allow for immunity for those who bribe 
public officials, so that they can be free to testify.143  South Korea 
allows courts to mitigate the sentences of whistleblowers that come 
forward with information about a crime in which the 
whistleblower was involved.144 
3.2.5. Prosecuting Associated Crimes 
A common and effective strategy for targeting public 
corruption is to integrate the investigation of those crimes with the 
investigation of other closely related conduct under other criminal 
statutes.  These statutes are not the anti-corruption laws 
themselves, but statutes that provide investigators with the 
jurisdictional latitude needed to gather the relevant information 
bearing on corrupt conduct and provide prosecutors with the 
evidence and legal theories to convert that information into 
criminal convictions.  Evidence of other criminal violations can 
lead investigators to evidence of corruption, or can be used to 
pressure targets or their associates into providing information 
about corruption crimes.  In the United States, prosecutors are 
authorized to simultaneously investigate multiple crimes, and can 
employ a variety of criminal statutes, depending on the conduct 
under investigation.  Several substantive criminal laws are 
invaluable tools for U.S. investigators and prosecutors in public 
corruption cases. 
One group of statutes regularly used in prosecuting corruption 
cases is the anti-money laundering laws.145  Both public corruption 
 
141 See Nelly Calderón Navarro, Fighting Corruption: The Peruvian Experience, 4 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 488, 493–500 (2006) (describing Peruvian Act  No. 27378 which 
enables negotiated justice). 
142 Gherardo Colombo, Investigating and Prosecuting Large-scale Corruption, 4 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 510, 512 (2006) (describing Italy’s sentence reduction mechanism).  
Italy also has a plea bargaining procedure that borrows from the American 
system.  Langer, supra note 99, at 46–53. 
143 ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia & the Pacific, supra note 4, 
at 50. 
144 Id. 
145 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957.  See, e.g., United States v. Lazarenko, 476 F.3d 642, 
645 (9th Cir. 2007) (referencing money laundering conviction of former Ukrainian 
Prime Minister for laundering proceeds of foreign corruption); United States v. 
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and money laundering offenses usually entail the concealment of 
financial transactions, and a money laundering theory can broaden 
the scope of a corruption investigation beyond the corrupt act itself 
to the ultimate disposition of the proceeds.  Charging the crimes 
together has several benefits as a matter of prosecution strategy.  In 
a trial where evidence of both a corrupt transaction and the 
subsequent laundering of the proceeds can be presented, the 
totality of the evidence is often much more compelling.  Money 
laundering evidence frequently will include documentation of 
expenditures by the defendants and evidence of concealment, 
which can support a motive theory and allow a fuller presentation 
of the defendants’ corrupt conduct.  Recognizing the connection 
between corruption and money laundering, article 14 of the 
UNCAC mandates that parties institute a comprehensive domestic 
regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank 
financial institutions.146  Because proceeds of corruption are rarely 
reported to taxing authorities, criminal tax evasion laws are also a 
useful weapon against corruption.147 
A second group of useful substantive statutes are obstruction 
of justice laws, including statutes protecting witnesses.148  Statutes 
 
Jackson, 72 F.3d 1370, 1385–86 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming convictions in a 
corruption case, including money laundering); United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 
1068, 1075–77  (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming money laundering conviction of a state 
senator); Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Warner, No. 02-CR-506 
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (public corruption case against former Illinois Governor, including 
money laundering and structuring charges); David M. Herszenhorn, Grand Jury 
Indicts Arizona Congressman, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, at A9 (reporting corruption 
and money laundering charges against Congressman). 
146 UNODC, supra note 31, at 43–51. 
147 See, e.g., Charles R. Babcock & Jonathan Weisman, Congressman Admits 
Taking Bribes, Resigns, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2005, at A1 (discussing Congressman 
Randy Cunningham’s guilty pleas to tax evasion and bribery charges); Jerry Bier, 
Setencich Convicted in Tax Case: Ex-Assembly Speaker is Found Guilty on a 1996 Charge 
but is Acquitted of a ‘97 Count, FRESNO BEE, June 30, 2000, at A1 (describing the 
conviction of former California Assembly Speaker on tax evasion charge); Paula 
McMahon, Jenne Weeps at Sentencing—Former Broward Sheriff Jailed Year and a Day, 
Fined $3,000, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 17, 2007, at 1A (discussing the 
sentencing of sheriff on tax evasion and corruption charges). 
148 Federal prosecutors frequently include obstruction of justice charges in 
indictments in public corruption cases.  See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Ford, 
No. 05-20201B (W.D. Tenn. 2005) (indicting state legislator for various crimes, 
including three counts of witness intimidation); Fourth Superseding Indictment, 
United States v. McFall, Cr. S-02-468 MCE (E.D. Cal. 2004) (public corruption case 
involving five defendants, including local and state officials, and charging various 
defendants, in addition to corruption offenses, with perjury, false statements to 
investigators, and witness tampering); Indictment, United States v. Traficant, No. 
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criminalizing the deliberate destruction of documents, lying to 
investigators, and perjury are also frequently utilized by anti-
corruption prosecutors.149  Witness protection laws have become 
key weapons in corruption cases in the United States,150 and the 
importance of these laws in corruption cases is also recognized in 
the UNCAC.151  Witness tampering and intimidation is a common 
feature of public corruption investigations.  Undetected, it greatly 
diminishes the chances for a successful prosecution.  When such 
acts can be charged along with the corruption crimes and evidence 
of them can be gathered and presented in court, however, it greatly 
enhances the prospects for a conviction, both on the obstruction 
and the underlying offense.  Testimony of a witness, forensic 
evidence of an email sent from the defendant’s computer, or, best 
of all, a surreptitiously recorded telephone conversation with a 
defendant, which establishes that the defendant attempted to 
influence another’s testimony or intimidate a witness, can be 
devastating to a defendant’s case.  Such conduct is materially 
 
01-CR-207 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (indicting a congressman on various charges 
including obstruction of justice for attempting to persuade another person to 
provide false testimony and destroy evidence). 
149 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1510(a) (obstruction of criminal investigations); id. § 
1516 (obstruction of federal audits); id. §§ 1517–1518 (obstruction of examinations 
of financial institutions and criminal health care investigations); id. § 1519 
(destruction of records); id. § 1001 (false statements); id. §§ 1621–1623 (perjury). 
150 In the United States, a wide variety of federal statutes are available to 
charge persons who attempt to improperly influence, intimidate, or injure 
witnesses. Tampering with witnesses, victims, or informants through physical 
force, threats, or corrupt persuasion is a serious crime.  18 U.S.C. § 1512.  
Punishments range from the potential death penalty for killing a witness, and a 
maximum of 20 years for attempted use of force against a witness, down to a 
maximum of a year for harassing a witness and thereby hindering or delaying her 
testimony.  Id.  § 1512(a)(3) & (d).  A general obstruction statute prohibits the use 
of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information 
concerning a federal crime to a criminal investigator.  Id. § 1510(a).  Threatening, 
intimidating, or corruptly influencing a juror is a crime.  Id. § 1503. 
151 Article 25(a) of the UNCAC mandates that parties to the convention 
criminalize not only the use of force, threats and intimidation against witnesses, 
but also the “promise, offering or giving of an undue advantage to induce false 
testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony . . . .”  UNODC, supra note 31, 
at 80, 94–95.  Thus the obligation under the convention “is to criminalize the use 
both of the corrupt means, such as bribery, and of coercive means, such as the use 
or threat of violence.”  Id. at 94.  Article 32 requires that parties enact measures to 
provide effective protection for witnesses from potential retaliation or 
intimidation.  These measures can include programs for physical protection of the 
witnesses, evidentiary rules to protect their identity, and rules to ensure the safety 
of witnesses while testifying.  Id. at 119, 141–46. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/3
2008] LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INDONESIA 233 
 
inconsistent with a defense based on the notion that the defendant 
had no criminal intent in committing the underlying act and has 
nothing to hide. 
Prosecutors in the United States also commonly make use of 
the general conspiracy law, which criminalizes agreements to 
commit other federal criminal offenses, and can be used to broaden 
the scope of almost any investigation.  Because conspiracy offenses 
can last for months or even years, and can include the conduct of a 
variety of actors with varying levels of culpability, they are ideal 
weapons for targeting the networks that engage in illegal 
corruption.152  Search warrants and other investigative techniques 
predicated on conspiracy laws may legitimately gather evidence 
not only of a specific corrupt transaction, but of the nature and 
history of the relationships that gave rise to the transaction.153  
Accordingly, prosecutors can make use of conspiracy laws to target 
and “flip” peripheral players who may provide incriminating 
evidence against the primary targets.154  While the UNCAC does 
not call expressly for enactment of a conspiracy law, it advocates 
the enactment of criminal laws targeting persons who participate 
in, instigate, or are accomplices to, the criminal conduct.155 
3.3. The Use of Key Procedural Tools to Investigate and Prosecute 
Public Corruption 
Collectively, the statutes and procedures described above are 
the key tools which investigators and prosecutors use in almost all 
 
152 18 U.S.C. § 371.  Some other commonly used federal anti-corruption 
statutes include their own conspiracy provisions.  See, e.g., id. § 1951(a) 
(conspiracies to commit extortion under color of official right); id. § 1956(h) 
(money laundering conspiracy); id. § 286 (conspiracy to submit fraudulent claims 
to the government). 
153 The Federal Bureau of Investigation frequently utilizes an “enterprise 
theory of investigation,” which focuses on targeting, diagramming, and 
dismantling whole criminal networks, rather than simply gathering evidence to 
prove a particular crime by a particular individual.  Richard A. McFeely, 
Enterprise Theory of Investigation, 70 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 19 (May 2001), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2001/may01leb.pdf. Under a 
conspiracy theory, culpability extends beyond the principals in the corrupt 
transactions at the heart of the investigation to other persons who facilitated or 
concealed the corrupt activity, or those who knowingly assisted or benefited from 
the crime.  Id.  
154 Co-conspirator statements, that is, statements made in furtherance of a 
criminal scheme are admissible in evidence in federal cases as exceptions to the 
hearsay rule.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
155 UNCAC, supra note 28, art. 27; UNODC, supra note 31, at 114–15. 
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major corruption investigations and prosecutions in the United 
States.  Indeed, the classic pattern for corruption investigations led 
by the FBI makes use of all of these procedures to get on the inside 
of corrupt networks, follow the money, and secure witnesses and 
evidence:  a whistleblower or other informant helps to initiate a 
lengthy undercover operation, the information gathered in that 
operation is corroborated and supported by the gathering and 
analysis of relevant financial records, the covert phase of the 
investigation concludes with a takedown in which multiple 
persons are charged, and prosecutors then negotiate guilty pleas 
and cooperation agreements with those defendants who are 
essentially caught red-handed.  The information provided by 
cooperating defendants snagged early in the investigation, 
together with analysis of more financial records and other 
investigation, is used to develop cases against additional 
defendants.  Even after the investigation has gone overt, 
cooperating defendants sometimes can gather information in an 
undercover capacity—particularly evidence of obstruction of 
justice offenses by new targets of the investigation.  Statutes used 
in the ensuing prosecution typically include money laundering, tax 
evasion, obstruction of justice, or conspiracy. 
Examples of successful corruption investigations following this 
methodology are legion:  the Abscam investigation in the late 
1970s, in which sixteen persons, including six congressmen and a 
U.S. senator were convicted after a two year investigation;156 
Operation Greylord, a lengthy investigation of payoffs and 
kickbacks in the Cook County judicial system in Illinois in the 
1980s, which led to the conviction of dozens of judges, attorneys, 
law enforcement officials, and a state legislator;157 Operation Rocky 
Top, a 1980s corruption investigation which resulted in the 
conviction of numerous state legislators and others in Tennessee;158 
the BRISPEC investigation of corruption in the state legislature in 
 
156 Robert D. McFadden, Williams’s Trial Is the Last of 8 Major Abscam Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1981, at 40 (describing Abscam investigation and resulting 
convictions). 
157 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Investigations of Public Corruption: 
Rooting Crookedness Out of Government, March 15, 2004, www.fbi.gov 
/page2/march04/greylord031504.htm (summarizing Operation Greylord on the 
20th anniversary of the conviction of a court clerk convicted of collecting bribes 
for Cook County judges). 
158 Sandra Roberts, Before Tennessee Waltz, There Was Rocky Top, TENNESSEAN, 
June 5, 2005, at 13A (describing the Rocky Top investigation and prosecutions). 
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California in the late 1980s, in which a number of assemblymen, 
state senators, staffers, and lobbyists were convicted after a long 
undercover operation;159 Operation Lost Trust, an early 1990s 
investigation into corruption in the South Carolina legislature 
which resulted in the conviction of a state legislator and others;160 
Operation Silver Shovel, a 1990s investigation of Chicago 
municipal elected officials, city employees, and others that netted 
multiple convictions;161 Operation Safe Road, a long-term 
investigation of corruption in Illinois state government, 
commenced in the late 1990s, which led to the convictions of scores 
of persons, including the former governor;162 Operation Lively 
Green, an investigation into corruption among military and law 
enforcement personnel in Arizona;163 Operation Tennessee Waltz, a 
recent investigation into corruption in the Tennessee legislature 
which resulted in convictions of a dozen state officials;164 the 
 
159 United States v. Jackson, 72 F.3d 1370, 1373–74 (9th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 588-92 (9th Cir. 1993); Robert Reinhold, U.S. Agents 
Seize Files In California Statehouse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1988, at A12. 
 
 
160 United States v. Blanding, 250 F.3d 858 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Derrick, 163 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 1998); 3 Carolina Politicians Are Indicted for Bribery, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1991, at A16. 
161 Don Terry, An Admission Of Corruption Probably Isn’t Chicago’s Last, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1996, at A17 (reporting that a city councilman who had pleaded 
guilty to taking bribes had agreed to cooperate by wearing a listening device in 
the federal investigation and introducing a federal informant to other corruption 
targets); FBI Chicago Div., FBI Major Investigation—Operation Silver Shovel, 
http://chicago.fbi.gov/silvershovel/silvershovel.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
162 U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, N. DIST. OF ILL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OPERATION 
SAFE ROAD: SUMMARY OF CASES 1 (2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osr 
/osrcasesummary.pdf; Matt O’Connor & Rudolph Bush, Ryan Gets 6 Years, CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 7, 2006, at 1. 
163 Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Three Current and Former U.S. Soldiers 
Plead Guilty to Participating in Bribery and Extortion Conspiracy (Mar. 24, 2006), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/March/06_crm_168.html; Final Two 
Defendants in ‘Operation Lively Green’ are Sentenced, REUTERS, Mar. 24, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS174693+24-Mar-
2008+PRN20080324; see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 30. 
164 Bonna Johnson, As Ford Goes to Prison, Ethics Laws on Trial, TENNESSEAN, 
Aug. 29, 2007, http://m.tennessean.com/detail.jsp?key=91387&full=1; Tennessee 
Waltz One Dozen Down, MEMPHIS COMMERICAL APPEAL.COM, Jan. 11, 2008, 
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2008/Jan/11/tennessee-waltz-one-
dozen-down/; Press Release, FBI, Tennessee Waltz, The Dance is Over (May 2, 
2008), http://www.fbi.gov/page2/may08/tennesseewaltz_050208.html. 
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investigation of Congressman William Jefferson;165 an ongoing 
investigation of corruption in Alaska which has resulted in seven 
convictions to date including three legislators and an aide to the 
former governor and in the indictment of a U.S. senator;166 and 
Operation Broken Boards, an investigation of corruption among 
state officials in New Jersey that resulted in a takedown in 
September 2007 involving the arrest of eleven officials, including 
two state assemblymen.167  A twenty-seven month FBI 
investigation of municipal corruption in Dallas, which included the 
use of informants, consensually recorded undercover telephone 
calls, and the analysis of records for over two hundred bank 
accounts, led recently to the indictment of sixteen persons, 
including several public officials.168 
The coordinated use of criminal statutes such as money 
laundering, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice, and of 
investigative procedures involving whistleblowers, undercover 
operations, gathering and analysis of financial records, and 
cooperation agreements with defendants, is not limited to large 
scale corruption investigations.  Such tools were used effectively in 
a local investigation of corruption in the area of Fresno, California, 
dubbed Operation Rezone, involving payoffs by developers to 
local officials.  A series of prosecutions arising from that 
investigation led to convictions of city councilmen, developers, and 
others.169  In another corruption case, a single multi-defendant case 
 
165 Jerry Markon & Allan Lengel, Lawmaker Indicted on Corruption Charges, 
WASH. POST, June 5, 2007, at A1; Lengel, supra note 126. 
166 Federal Agents Raid Legislative Offices, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 5, 
2006, http://dwb.adn.com/news/politics/fbi/story/8428723p-8036832c.html; 
Karl Vick, ‘I’ll Sell My Soul to the Devil,’  WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2007, at A01; Press 
Release, Dept. of Justice, Former Alaska State Representative Victor Kohring 
Sentenced on Public Corruption Charges (May 8, 2008), http://anchorage.fbi.gov 
/doj/pressrel/2008/publiccorruption050808.htm. 
167 David W. Chen, New Jersey Officials Arrested in Corruption Scandal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at B1. 
168 Rudolph Bush, Cash Flowed Through Circle of Corruption, Prosecutors Allege, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 2, 2007, http://www.dallasnews.com 
/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/DN-whathappened_02met.ART 
.State.Edition2.42998e9.html; Dave Levinthal et al., City Hall Bribery Indictments ‘A 
Sad Day or Dallas,’ DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 2, 2007, 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/10020
7dnmetindictments.129b687ca.html.  The main indictment in that case included 
multiple conspiracy charges, including money laundering conspiracy.  
Indictment, United States v. Donald Hill, No. 3:07-CR 289-R (N.D. Tex. 2007). 
169 Mark Arax & Mark Gladstone, Leading Fresno Developer is Indicted on 
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prosecuted in the Eastern District of California in 2003–05, 
investigators and prosecutors used an undercover investigation, an 
extensive analysis of bank account records, and numerous plead-
and-cooperate agreements to secure guilty pleas from ten 
defendants involved in a bribery ring that was making payments 
to two U.S. State Department employees to obtain nonimmigrant  
 
visas.170  In addition to bribery charges, the indictment in that case 
included conspiracy and money laundering charges. 
As noted above, the major obstacles to investigating and 
prosecuting public corruption cases are universal in nature, and 
similar mechanisms have repeatedly been used with great success 
in other countries.  In countries that have criminal procedures 
allowing the use of investigative strategies similar to those 
employed in the United States, the same methodology has had 
equally impressive results.  In the United Kingdom, Operation 
Othona, a four year investigation into corruption in London’s 
Metropolitan Police Service in the mid-1990s, led to the conviction 
of numerous police officers.171  Investigators and prosecutors 
worked together in the course of the investigation, using 
informants, undercover operations, and the cooperation of 
defendants to build their prosecutions.172  In Italy, a civil law 
country like Indonesia, the multi-year Clean Hands investigation 
of corrupt political officials in the 1990s employed similar tools—
the use of informants or whistleblowers, undercover operations, 
the analysis of financial records, and bargaining with defendants to 
secure their cooperation against other participants in the corrupt 
network.173  Hundreds of persons were charged in the course of 
that investigation, which profoundly shook Italian politics.174 
 
Corruption Charges, DAILY REPUBLICAN, Feb. 21, 1998, http://www.dailyrepublican 
.com/fresno_developer_indicted.html.  See also United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 
1034 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming conviction for corruption-related offenses 
committed during tenure as city councilman). 
170 Indictment, United States v. Johnson, CR. No. S-03-202 GEB (E.D. Cal. 
2004); Denny Walsh, Two Plead Guilty to Bribery for Visas, SACRAMENTO BEE,  May 1, 
2004, at A7. 
171 John Dempsey-Brench, Investigation and Prosecution of Police Corruption: 
Operation Othona, in ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, supra 
note 27, at 52–60. 
172 Id. at 53–58. 
173 Colombo, supra note 142, at 520. 
174 John Moody, Sick of It All, TIME, Mar. 8, 1993, at 48. 
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The effectiveness of the criminal procedures described above in 
rooting out public corruption has been demonstrated in the United 
States and many other countries over the last thirty years.  
Unfortunately, investigators and prosecutors in many countries in 
the developing world, including Indonesia, are hamstrung by the 
unavailability of such tools under the antiquated criminal 
procedure regimes that define their authority. 
 
 
 
 
4. EQUIPPING LAW ENFORCEMENT TO SUCCEED: 
PROGRESS AND REMAINING 
GAPS IN INDONESIA 
In only a few years, Indonesia has made substantial progress in 
addressing multiple aspects of comprehensive anti-corruption 
reform.  As noted above, various steps are being taken to address 
the widely recognized need for institutional reform and greater 
law enforcement coordination.  Criminal code reform has occurred 
to update and define the core corruption crimes.  But less attention 
has been directed at modernizing the laws that enable law 
enforcement to investigate and prosecute these cases effectively.  
To the extent legislative reform has enhanced law enforcement’s 
investigatory abilities, it has largely been directed at the KPK, a 
short-term focus that leaves the nation’s primary law enforcement 
institutions ill-equipped to sustain the anti-corruption effort over 
the long term.  Below we briefly assess the status of the Indonesian 
criminal code with respect to the tools and techniques necessary to 
investigate and prosecute public corruption effectively. 
4.1. Whistleblower Protection Laws 
Some Indonesian laws provide some types of protections to 
whistleblowers, but none effectively shields them from the injury 
they are most likely to suffer, which is professional or workplace 
retaliation.175  In at least one instance, with respect to a state 
 
175 Some rudimentary whistleblower provisions have been inserted into 
recently enacted laws.  Indonesia Corruption Watch, Protecting Whistle-blowers 
in Corruption Cases, Aug. 28, 2006, http://www.antikorupsi.org/eng/index.php 
?option=com_content&task=view&id=475&Itemid=2.  The 1999 anti-corruption 
law contained an article requiring that the identity of a reporting person not be 
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auditor who became a witness for the KPK, the KPK was able to 
physically protect the witness with the assistance of the police, but 
could not protect him from workplace retaliation.176  Corruption in 
Indonesia is often entrenched in government agencies where it is 
vertically integrated, in which lower level officials take in illegal 
“fees” and commissions at the direction of higher officials, with the 
proceeds flowing up the chain of command.  Without adequate, 
enforceable whistle-blower protection laws, lower level employees 
in a position to observe and report corruption directed by higher 
level officials as part of the vertically integrated corruption typical 
in Indonesia are unlikely to come forward. 
4.2. Undercover Operations 
As described above, another impediment to effective anti-
corruption prosecution is the narrow and rigid structure of current 
Indonesian evidence rules, which list the types of evidence 
 
disclosed at trial, but there is no anti-retaliation provision in the law, or any 
enforcement mechanism.  Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption 
Offences, art. 31(1) (Indon.).  The 2002 anti-money laundering law, amended the 
following year, is slightly better, although the scope of the protection afforded in 
that statute is narrow—it appears to be intended to protect bank employees and 
similarly situated persons who are mandated to report suspicious transactions, 
similar to the U.S. statute which protects financial institution employees who 
make reports.  31 U.S.C. § 5328 (2006).  In the anti-money laundering law, 
investigators, prosecutors, and judges are also required to keep the identity of a 
reporting party secret, and the law contains a provision authorizing a suit for 
damages by the reporting party if her identity is revealed in violation of the 
statute.  Law Number 15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, as 
amended by Law Number 25 of 2003, art. 39 (Indon.).  Parties making reports 
concerning money laundering or suspected money laundering are immune from 
prosecution and civil suit for making such reports, and are entitled to “special 
protection” against threats, although the nature of such protection is not specified. 
Id.  arts. 40, 42, 43.  The law that created the KPK also obliged the KPK to “provide 
protection to witnesses or whistle-blowers providing reports and information 
regarding corrupt acts.”  Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 15(a) (Indon.).  The nature 
of the “protection” to be provided is not specified, however, and there is no 
enforcement mechanism to prevent workplace retaliation.  The new witness 
protection law includes a provision that purports to confer civil and criminal 
immunity for witnesses or victims who testify.  Law Number 13 of 2006 on 
Protection of Witness and Victim, art. 10(1) (Indon.).  While this is a significant 
improvement, it still does not shield a whistleblower from professional or 
workplace retaliation. 
176 Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas, “We Will Protect the Witness,” TEMPO, Apr. 
19–25, 2005 (on file with author); Informant Law a Must, JAKARTA POST, April 25, 
2005, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/04/25/informant-law-must 
.html.  The case is described below in more detail in the text accompanying 
footnotes 180–81. 
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admissible in a criminal case.177  The evidence code does not 
explicitly authorize undercover operations or list audiotapes as 
admissible, which means that prosecutors cannot rely on being 
able to use the fruits of such an investigation at trial.  Additionally, 
due both to distrust of law enforcement born of rampant 
corruption and an outlook shaped by the non-adversarial civil law 
system there, Indonesian judges remain suspicious of the 
undercover technique and often view any interaction between law 
enforcement and investigation targets as unlawful or inappropriate 
entrapment.178 
Because of the lack of express statutory authority, most 
prosecutors are unfamiliar with the technique and it has been tried 
in only a few cases.179  In one, the newly staffed KPK arranged a 
sting operation in which a state audit agency official agreed to act 
undercover and to wear a recording device.  The auditor met with 
a member of the General Elections Commission, who had planned 
to bribe him to rig the audit of the Elections Commission.  The two 
met in a hotel room, and the discussion and payment of cash was 
recorded on audiotape and videotape.180 
The Elections Commission official was arrested at the scene 
and subsequently convicted.  The investigation that unfolded 
following that arrest led to the conviction of several additional 
members of the elections commission on corruption charges. This 
 
177 See supra, Section 2.2. 
178 There are several reasons why the use of undercover techniques such as 
sting operations are more easily accepted in common law countries.  First, in 
common law countries members of law enforcement are generally presumed to be 
able to engage in any conduct that is not illegal or unethical.  By contrast, in many 
civil law countries members of law enforcement are expected to take only those 
actions for which they have express authorization.  Second, in the common law 
conception of criminal conduct, a crime involves both an act (actus reus) and 
criminal intent (mens rea).  Since law enforcement and those operating under 
their direction have no criminal intent, but rather are attempting to enforce the 
law, their conduct is not criminal.  In many civil law countries, where crimes are 
often defined purely by the nature of the act at issue, this distinction is less 
meaningful. 
179 Among prosecutors with whom we discussed undercover techniques, 
there was little understanding of the concepts of predication and the defense of 
entrapment.  Indeed, prosecutors sometimes used the word “entrapment” to 
mean a valid undercover contact. 
180 Tony Hotland, KPK Determined to Uncover Graft in KPU, JAKARTA POST, 
April 12, 2005, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/04/12/kpk-
determined-uncover-graft-kpu.html; KPU ‘Tactical Funds’ Were for BPK: Treasurer, 
JAKARTA POST, April 14, 2005, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/04/14 
/kpu-039tactical-funds039-were-bpk-treasurer.html. 
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operation was one of the early successes of the KPK.181 
In another, investigators with Timtas Tipikor were 
investigating a complaint by a witness in a trial in south Jakarta 
that the judge in the trial had been attempting to extort him.  The 
witness agreed to record a meeting with the judge’s clerk at a 
restaurant, at which the witness was to hand over the money.  
After the money was handed over, investigators confronted the 
clerk, who then agreed to call the judge.  The telephone call from 
the clerk to the judge confirming the payment was recorded by 
investigators.  Satellite message system messages were also taken 
as evidence.  The judge was subsequently arrested, and later 
convicted.182 
But even these instances—apparent successes—illustrate how 
undercover activity is not yet widely understood or accepted in 
Indonesia.  The powerful undercover evidence in the KPK’s high-
profile investigation of the elections commission was accepted by 
the new Anti-Corruption Court, although it might not have been 
by other courts.  The KPK’s cooperating auditor, however, was 
criticized and then fired by the audit agency for his role in 
uncovering the scandal, because his acts in discussing the bribe 
with the elections commission official were deemed a violation of 
the audit agency’s ethics code.183  In the Timtas Tipikor case, 
although the recorded telephone call with the judge was 
tantamount to a confession, prosecutors were unsure until the 
middle of trial whether the court would accept the evidence of the 
call.  In each case, the undercover operation consisted of only a 
single contact.  To our knowledge, more elaborate undercover 
operations have hardly ever been attempted in public corruption 
investigations in Indonesia.184 
 
181 Supreme Court Cuts Ex-KPU Chief’s Jail Sentence, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 17, 
2008, http://www.ppatk.go.id/berita_eng.php?nid=2786 (discussing convictions 
and appeals of four Elections Commissions officials). 
182 Baskoro et al., supra note 77, at 4. 
183 Hardjapamekas, supra note 176; Informant Law a Must, supra note 176. 
184 See Abdul Khalik, KPK’s Month-Long Secretive Probe Pays Off, JAKARTA 
POST, June 2, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/02/kpk039s-
monthlong-secretive-probe-pays.html (describing a KPK raid on a customs service 
office in Jakarta, and reporting that KPK investigators went undercover, posing as 
import-export business owners to conduct transactions with corrupt customs 
officials. If accurate, this would be one of the first such operations in the country). 
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4.3. Access to Financial Records 
While there are several Indonesian statutes that, in theory, 
permit law enforcement access to bank records in corruption cases, 
these provisions are limited, cumbersome, and ineffective.  The 
Indonesian banking laws permit the police, prosecutors, and 
judges to request records from banks, but only for the accounts of 
identified suspects or defendants themselves.185  In order to request 
the records, the chief of the National Police, the attorney general, or 
the chief justice of the Supreme Court must send a letter of request 
to the central bank, the Bank of Indonesia, which in turn may 
request production of the records from the relevant bank.186  Aside 
from the lengthy delays inherent in such a request, a more 
problematic issue is that the production of records under the 
banking law is not mandatory.  As a result, no enforcement 
mechanism exists if the bank turns down the request.  Resistance 
by banks and banking authorities often results in a failure to obtain 
any records under this provision.187  The 1999 anti-corruption 
law188 and the 2002 law creating the KPK189 only marginally 
 
185 Law Number 7 of 1992 Concerning Banks, amended by Law Number 10 of 
1998, art. 42 (Indon.). 
186 Id. 
187 For example, one prosecutor with whom we spoke about the use of this 
mechanism indicated that it is rarely used, in part because the Bank of Indonesia 
sometimes did not respond, or did not do so in a timely manner, and that it often 
questioned the law enforcement agency’s need for the records, or would deem the 
stated reasons given by law enforcement as insufficient to overcome 
considerations of bank secrecy. 
188 Under the 1999 law, corruption cases are investigated under already 
existing procedures unless otherwise indicated in the 1999 law.  Law Number 31 
of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offences, art. 26 (Indon.).  The 1999 law 
authorized an investigator, prosecutor or judge to ask for bank records, avoiding 
the necessity for a letter from the Chief of the National Police, the attorney 
general, or the chief justice of the Supreme Court.  Id. art. 29(1).  The authority to 
request records under the 1999 law, however, continues to be limited to 
information concerning an identified suspect or defendant, and does not extend to 
family members, businesses or business partners, associates, or others whose 
accounts might be holding corruption proceeds or whose account records may 
yield evidence of a corruption crime.  The request authority also appears to be 
limited to the investigation of corruption offenses, and cannot be used for the 
investigation of related crimes.  As under the banking law, the 1999 law directs 
that a request for banking information be routed to the Bank of Indonesia, and 
states that the information is “subject to the prevailing laws and regulations.”  Id. 
art. 29(2).  Although the 1999 law required the Bank of Indonesia to respond to a 
request within three business days, it did not mandate that the Bank of Indonesia 
actually compel the production of records.  As with the banking law, the 1999 law 
merely authorizes law enforcement to request certain records, and does not 
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improved the procedure for obtaining bank records in corruption 
cases.  In its late 2006 study of the gaps between Indonesian law 
and the UNCAC, the KPK indicated that since it has no ability to 
compel compliance with requests for financial information on 
suspects or defendants, “compliance by banks with requests for the 
lifting of bank secrecy is said to still be rather low.”190 
Existing law does not allow investigators or prosecutors to 
even seek bank records relating to accounts held in the name of 
front companies, or of relatives or associates of the corruption 
target or defendant.  Since corruption cases commonly involve 
indirect payoffs, or proceeds hidden in the names of others, this 
limitation on the availability of bank records is a serious constraint 
on law enforcement. 
The Indonesian money laundering law, enacted in 2002 and 
amended the next year, also contains a provision for accessing 
 
require banks to produce them.  Neither the banking law procedure nor the 1999 
law procedure requires that a bank maintain in confidence the fact that a request 
for records has been received from law enforcement.  The 1999 law also contained 
a new provision authorizing an investigator, prosecutor or judge to ask a bank to 
block a bank account owned by a suspect that is believed to contain proceeds of a 
corruption offense.  Id. art. 29(4).  The law again only authorizes requests, 
however, and does not mandate responses from the relevant financial institution.  
In any event, absent a way of obtaining documentation concerning activity in a 
bank account in a timely and confidential manner, the ability to block that account 
is largely meaningless. 
189 Under the 2002 law, the KPK is to conduct investigations and prosecutions 
in accordance with the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code and the 1999 law, 
unless the 2002 law provides otherwise.  Law Number 30 of 2002, arts. 38–39 
(Indon.).  The new KPK was given authority to request information from banks or 
other financial institutions, but as with the 1999 law, such requests are limited to 
an identified suspect or defendant, and again there is no requirement that the 
banks comply with the request.  Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 12(1)(c) (Indon.).  
The KPK was awarded stronger authority than existed under the 1999 law to 
order banks and other financial institutions to block accounts, and that authority 
extended not only to suspects and defendants, but to “other connected parties.”  
Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 12(1)(d) (Indon.).  Since the KPK cannot request 
banking information concerning other parties, however, and cannot compel the 
production of information concerning suspects and defendants, this authority is 
somewhat illusory.  The KPK was also authorized to temporarily halt financial 
transactions where there was evidence connecting the transaction to a corruption 
case under investigation, but there is no corresponding seizure and forfeiture 
authority.  Law Number 30 of 2002, art. 12(1)(g) (Indon.). 
190 KPK GAP REPORT, supra note 7, at 39; see also U.N. Dev. Programme, supra 
note 63, at 52 (noting the imbalance in the 2002 law between the authority 
conferred on the KPK to request documents from state institutions and the lack of 
a provision requiring that those institutions comply with KPK requests). 
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bank records.191  The law allows an investigator, prosecutor or 
judge to request records from financial services providers through 
a letter signed by the chief of the National Police or a regional 
chief, the attorney general or the head of a provincial prosecutor’s 
office, or the chief justice of the Supreme Court or the head of a 
panel of judges hearing a criminal case.192  Importantly, the money 
laundering law specifically states that “the provisions of laws 
stipulating bank secrecy and the secrecy of other financial 
transactions shall not be applicable” to such requests.193  This is the 
most permissive provision in Indonesian law with respect to law 
enforcement access to bank records.  Such requests are still limited 
in scope, however, and in this case it is limited to the assets of 
persons identified as a suspect, named as a defendant, or referred 
to law enforcement by the Indonesian financial intelligence unit, 
known as the PPATK.  Also, such a request is an available law 
enforcement tool only in money laundering investigations.  
Neither the KPK nor the Special Crimes branch of the AGO—the 
two agencies with prosecutorial authority over public corruption 
crimes—have authority to prosecute money laundering crimes.  As 
a practical matter, therefore, the somewhat stronger authority to 
obtain bank account records under the money laundering law is of 
little assistance in combating public corruption. 
Because of this lack of timely access to financial records, most 
investigators and prosecutors have little experience in tracing and 
analyzing financial data, and are often forced to assemble cases 
without recourse to the most basic evidence of the crime.  As the 
KPK has observed, “the ‘follow the money’ approach to 
investigation is not yet well understood and used within 
Indonesian law enforcement agencies.”194 
 
191  Law Number 15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, as 
amended by Law Number 25 of 2003, art. 33 (Indon.).  The money laundering law 
also provided that investigations should be undertaken in accordance with the 
Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code unless otherwise indicated in the money 
laundering law.  Id. art. 30. 
192 Id. art. 33(3)–(4). 
193 Id. art. 33(2). 
194 KPK GAP REPORT, supra note 7, at 31 (illustrating that although the PPATK 
is not a law enforcement agency, its expertise is available to the KPK and AGO on 
a case-by-case basis). 
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4.4. Immunity and Sentence Reduction Mechanisms 
There are no immunity or sentence reduction mechanisms in 
Indonesia to induce or reward persons who cooperate with law 
enforcement in criminal cases.  Indeed, far from rewarding those 
who come forward with information, prosecutors with whom we 
spoke felt duty-bound to prosecute such persons, and the law does 
not provide for relief in most cases.195 
 
The law setting forth the authority of the attorney general 
includes a clause permitting him to “terminate cases in the public 
interest.”196  Within Indonesia, however, this provision is 
understood not as an immunity mechanism to be used in exchange 
for useful information, but rather as authority to dismiss cases on 
humanitarian grounds in instances where the defendant is elderly 
or ill, or in other extraordinary circumstances.  There have been 
discussions with the AGO and with civil society groups about the 
possibility of promulgating a regulation that would define “the 
public interest” to include situations in which defendants in 
corruption cases agreed to cooperate and return their ill-gotten 
gains, but, perhaps fearing the appearance of a concession to high 
profile corruption defendants, no such regulation has been issued.  
In any event, such a regulation might not be feasible in light of 
Article 4 of the 1999 anti-corruption law, which specifically states 
that restitution to the state shall not nullify the sentence of a 
perpetrator convicted of corruption crimes under that law.197 
A type of informal charge bargaining is sometimes used by the 
police to induce cooperation.  The police may charge a suspect 
with a single crime, withholding other or more serious charges to 
see if the suspect cooperates.  If he refuses, additional charges may 
ensue.  This may sometimes be effective, although the lack of any 
 
195  In the KPK case involving an investigation of Supreme Court clerks who 
allegedly extorted litigants, the criminal defendant who came forward with 
information that led to the prosecution hoped for leniency in his own case, but 
received none.  In fact, the press speculated that the defendant’s sentence, as 
imposed by the Supreme Court, was harsher than it otherwise would have been.  
See also Eva C. Komandjaja, Probosutedjo Seeks Graft Case Review, JAKARTA POST, 
Dec. 5, 2005,  http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/12/05/probosutedjo-
seeks-graft-case-review.html. 
196 Law Number 16 of 2004 Concerning the Prosecution Service, art. 35(c) 
(Indon.). 
197 Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offences, art. 4 
(Indon.). 
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written or recognized procedure means that the process lacks 
transparency and accountability, and suspects cannot be confident 
that cooperation will actually result in a benefit.  Neither police, 
prosecutors, nor judges are bound by such an agreement.  
Moreover, unless the police forego charging a crime with a much 
higher penalty, such charging decisions may or may not have a 
material impact on the ultimate sentence imposed. 
The new witness protection law includes a single-sentence 
provision that appears to be the farthest Indonesia has yet come 
towards contemplating some type of express legal recognition of 
the value of testimony from cooperating defendants.  The new 
provision states that a suspect who testifies cannot be acquitted on 
account of his testimony if he is legally guilty, but that the judge 
may take his testimony into account in reducing his sentence.198  
How the provision will function in practice is not yet clear, but it is 
far from the sort of express sentence-reduction mechanism that 
would be likely to induce a defendant to turn on his criminal 
associates and to be of substantial assistance to investigators or 
prosecutors.  The provision does not authorize prosecutors to seek 
a lower sentence, and does not identify how much of a sentence 
reduction might be appropriate.  The provision also does not 
require that the cooperator provide substantial cooperation to law 
enforcement, that his information/testimony be found to be 
truthful and complete, or that the cooperator identify or return ill-
gotten gains in order to qualify for a sentence reduction.  Without 
an effective legal mechanism to turn lower-level defendants 
against more culpable figures up the chain, investigators and 
prosecutors will continue to have difficulty exposing and 
dismantling networks of corruption, since those most likely to be 
caught red-handed—the front counter functionaries, clerks, and 
delivery men—have no incentive to cooperate against their more 
powerful superiors. 
4.5. Prosecuting Associated Crimes 
Indonesia has in place some of the criminal statutes that are 
commonly used in conjunction with the enforcement of anti-
corruption laws.  In 2002, Indonesia enacted a comprehensive 
scheme addressing the crimes that constitute money laundering, a 
 
198 Law Number 13 of 2006 on Protection of Witness and Victim, art. 10(2) 
(Indon.). 
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reform highly significant to the effort to update anti-corruption law 
enforcement.199  The law also created a national financial 
intelligence unit called the Financial Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Center, known by its Indonesian acronym as the 
PPATK.200  The agency has become the leading resource in 
Indonesia for educating law enforcement and the judiciary about 
the crime of money laundering, and has become a key player in 
efforts to detect and prosecute public corruption and 
embezzlement crimes in the country.  Nevertheless, there have 
been few money laundering prosecutions.201  We found that there 
was relatively little understanding of the money laundering crimes 
among most police, prosecutors, and judges with whom we had 
contact with in Indonesia, but with the provisions firmly 
embedded in the criminal code, and given the active role the 
PPATK has staked itself out to play, this will likely change in 
time.202 
 
199 Like its U.S. counterpart, the Indonesian law criminalizes transactions 
involving proceeds of certain types of crimes.  Law Number 15 of 2002 
Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, as amended by Law Number 25 of 
2003, art. 3 (Indon.).  The predicate offenses include crimes of corruption, bribery, 
embezzlement, and fraud.  Id. arts. 2(1)(a), (b), (p), (q).  The law also includes 
reporting requirements for large cash transactions similar to the Currency 
Transaction Report reporting requirements in U.S. law, and criminal provisions 
for evading the reporting requirements.  Id. arts. 8, 9, 13, 16. 
200 Id. arts. 18-29b.  This unit is similar to the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network in the United States. The PPTAK, like its U.S. counterpart, has the 
authority to receive and analyze transaction reports from financial institutions, 
make referrals to law enforcement, and provide data to law enforcement.  Id. arts. 
26-27, 33.  The PPATK, staffed in part by former members of law enforcement 
agencies, has supplied expert witnesses for use by prosecutors as forensic 
accountants in fraud and corruption prosecutions.  It has been reported that 
reports by the PPATK on suspicious banking transactions by high level officials in 
the Indonesian National Police have played a role in efforts to root out police 
corruption.  DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 57–58 (discussing instances of 
collaboration between the police and the PPATK).  USAID is currently 
implementing a project, called the Financial Crimes Prevention Project, aimed at 
building capacity at the PPATK and assisting it in training officials at other 
agencies about the new anti-money laundering regime.  A set of amendments to 
the money laundering law which would broaden the scope of the anti-money 
laundering crimes, increase reporting requirements from financial entities, and 
strengthen the PPATK, is currently under consideration by the Indonesian 
legislature. 
201 Recently, prosecutors in Jakarta charged a money laundering offense 
together with a bank fraud scheme involving the loss of public funds. 
202 Although the crime itself was not well understood, most were aware of 
the new money laundering law, and there was general familiarity with the 
concept of, or at least the term, money laundering.  The PPATK is rapidly 
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As noted above, the 1999 anti-corruption law created 
obstruction of justice and false statements crimes relating to 
corruption.203  There is no criminal witness tampering law in 
Indonesia, however.  Although there are ample criminal statutes 
relating to, for example, murder, kidnapping, and assault,204 and a 
new witness protection law is intended to provide a type of 
witness security program to protect witnesses from physical 
harm,205 no laws proscribe bribery of a witness, suborning perjury, 
corruptly persuading a witness to give false evidence, or harassing 
or retaliating against a witness. 
The Indonesian criminal code has no general conspiracy 
provision, but it does have statutes that extend criminal liability on 
an aiding and abetting or accomplice theory.206  There are statutes 
criminalizing illegal logging, smuggling, and other crimes that are 
commonly associated with public corruption in Indonesia. 
Indonesia is thus relatively well-equipped with substantive 
criminal laws that could be brought to bear in the context of public 
corruption prosecutions.  A serious problem there, however, is the 
fragmentation of authority to use these substantive laws.  In the 
civil law tradition, prosecutors have little discretion over target 
selection and charging decisions.207  While prosecutors in the 
United States, working with investigators, are free to follow the 
evidence wherever it leads and to charge any criminal conduct that 
is uncovered, prosecutors in Indonesia are typically assigned to 
 
developing expertise and experience, and the agency itself, although small, has a 
high public profile, and has been vigorously raising consciousness of money 
laundering and promoting the use of anti-money laundering laws.  The number of 
suspicious financial transactions reported to the PPATK each year by financial 
institutions has been rising steadily.  Abdul Khalik, Suspicious Transactions Up 
Ahead of 2009 Polls: Center, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 2, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost 
.com/news/2008/02/02/suspicious-transactions-ahead-2009-polls-center.html. 
203 Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offences, arts. 21–22 
(Indon.). 
204 PENAL CODE arts. 333–60 (Indon.). 
205 Law Number 13 of 2006 on Protection of Witness and Victim (Indon.). 
206 PENAL CODE arts. 55–56 (Indon.).  There are also accessory statutes that 
apply to some crimes.  Id. arts. 164–65.  The 1999 anti-corruption law also has a 
provision which criminalizes aiding and abetting or conspiring to commit a 
corruption offense, although the statute does not appear to encompass a 
conspiracy theory as it is understood in common law countries.  Law Number 31 
of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offences, art. 15 (Indon.). 
207 Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems: 
The Rule of Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J. L. & 
TRADE AM. 323, 338–41 (1998). 
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handle a particular alleged crime, with their authority limited 
accordingly.  Within the AGO, public corruption crimes are 
investigated by the police and/or the Special Crimes Division, and 
prosecuted by the Special Crimes Division.  Most other crimes, 
however, are handled by the General Crimes Division, which lacks 
investigative authority.  The two divisions generally handle their 
prosecutions separately.208  The KPK does not appear to have any 
authority to charge money laundering or other non-corruption 
offenses in cases it brings before the Anti-Corruption Court. 
There has been some recognition of this problem of “stove-
piped” law enforcement authority.  The KPK has signed 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) with the AGO and the 
National Police to enhance coordination.209  But the inability to 
utilize all substantive criminal laws to leverage efforts against 
public corruption continues to be an impediment to effective 
enforcement. 
* * * * * 
While Indonesia has a panoply of basic laws that criminalize 
public corruption and related activity such as money laundering, 
its lack of an adequate investigative infrastructure established in 
the criminal procedure code impedes enforcement of violations of 
those laws.  Despite real political will, new anti-corruption 
institutions, and numerous new or revised substantive anti-
corruption laws, the current Indonesian criminal provisions 
relating to detecting and investigating offenses allow law 
enforcement to do little more than gather rumors and interrogate 
suspects—a wholly ineffective strategy in corruption cases.  In 
order to equip law enforcement with the tools it needs to penetrate 
corrupt networks, follow the money, and secure the necessary 
witnesses and other evidence to really become a credible weapon 
against corruption, Indonesia (like many other developing 
countries) needs legislative reform that goes beyond simply 
enacting substantive corruption crimes. 
 
208 In any event, given the limited prosecutorial involvement in 
investigations conducted by the police, charging decisions are often shaped by the 
nature of the police investigation. 
209 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 54. 
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5. A SHORT LEGISLATIVE AGENDA TO EQUIP DEVELOPING   
COUNTRY LAW ENFORCEMENT FOR THE LONG TERM 
5.1. Preliminary Considerations 
5.1.1 The Timing of Legal Reform in Indonesia 
The distance from reform proposal to enacted statute can be 
daunting.  As in many countries, the legislative process in 
Indonesia is fraught with uncertainty, plagued with delays, and 
buffeted by conflicting domestic political winds.  In addition to 
these standard features of the legislative process, the current 
political environment in Indonesia is not conducive to rapid law 
making, since previous elections have resulted in a number of 
political parties securing significant representation in the 
legislature, resulting in a multi-polar power structure in which no 
one party or coalition of parties is capable of scripting a legislative 
agenda. 
Despite these obstacles, various factors suggest that now is an 
auspicious time for criminal procedure reform in Indonesia.  “We 
have to acknowledge that the public is really fed up with the 
conventional legal system,” a judge of the Anti-Corruption Court 
recently told a public forum in Jakarta.210  Public pressure for more 
demonstrable progress in the struggle against entrenched 
corruption has not abated, and with the approach of Presidential 
elections in 2009, both the incumbent and challengers are likely to 
seek to demonstrate commitment to that effort.211  Any president 
 
210 Independent Taskforce Drafts New Anticorruption Court Law, JAKARTA POST, 
Dec. 1, 2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid 
=20071201.H03. 
211 See generally Irawaty Wardany, Faith Groups Demand Corruption Court Law, 
JAKARTA POST, Oct. 23, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/10/23 
/faith-groups-demand-corruption-court-law.html; Clean up the Judicial 
Commission from Cronies, KOMPAS, Oct. 17, 2007 (unpublished U.S. Embassy 
translation on file with author); Graft Has ‘No Roots in Our Culture,’ JAKARTA POST, 
Dec. 10, 2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid 
=20071210.A05; Kalla Says Fight Against Corruption Still Slow, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 6, 
2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20071206.A04; 
J. Kristiadi, Optimize Momentum to Fight Corruption, KOMPAS, Oct. 2, 2007 
(unpublished U.S. Embassy translation on file with author); Desy Nurhayati, 
Don’t Rest On Laurels, Says Yudhoyono, JAKARTA POST, June 13, 2008, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/13/don039t-rest-laurels-says-
yudhoyono.html; Ridwan Max Sijabat, Graft Watchdog Says No Quick Fix, JAKARTA 
POST, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.ppatk.go.id/berita.php?nid=2287; VP Kalla 
Warns Against Taking Bribes, JAKARTA POST, Sept. 29, 2007, 
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elected in 2009 is likely to have campaigned, at least in part, on a 
platform that includes stronger measures to eradicate corruption. 
The current Police Chief and the Attorney General both appear 
to be committed to taking stronger action against corruption.212  
The KPK, now over four years old, has become a force not only in 
prosecuting corruption but in advocating administrative and legal 
changes to prevent and detect corruption.  New leadership has 
taken the helm at the agency, which is giving it new energy and 
impetus; it has already moved aggressively in bringing charges 
against legislators, top officials at the central bank, Bank Indonesia, 
and others.213  Indonesia helped found a new international 
grouping of anti-corruption enforcement agencies, and sponsored 
the second annual conference of the organization in Bali, 
Indonesia, in November 2007.214  The second session of the 
Conference of States Parties of the UNCAC met in Bali in late 
January 2008, helping to ensure continued visibility and political 
impetus to efforts to implement anti-corruption reforms.215 
 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20070929.@02. 
212 See Poernomo Gontha Ridho & Erwin Dariyanto, The General’s Broom, 
TEMPO, Aug. 29–Sept. 4, 2006, http://www.infid.be/general_broom.htm 
(describing Inspector General’s efforts to clean house within the National Police).  
The current Attorney General, Hendarman Supandji, was formerly the Junior 
Attorney General in charge of the Special Crimes Division, which investigates and 
prosecutes corruption, and was also head of Timtas Tipikor, the inter-agency anti-
corruption team.  He is viewed as a reformist committed to taking on corruption.  
Ramage, supra note 86, at 9; La Mont, supra note 87; KPK to Prioritize Cases in ‘08 
with Strong Evidence, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com 
/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20080104.@01.  The pressure to reform the AGO is 
particularly acute following the conviction of a senior prosecutor on corruption 
charges.  See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the recent 
crackdown on corrupt officials within the AGO). 
213 See Gelling, supra note 73 (commenting on the selection of new KPK 
members, and detailing a number of their successful prosecutions); Abdul Khalik, 
KPK Vows To Go After Lawmakers in BI Case, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 8, 2008, 
http://www.ppatk.go.id/berita_eng.php?nid=2933; Ridwan Max Sijabat, 
Controversial Prosecutor Selected as KPK Chief, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 6, 2007, 
http://old.thejakartapost.com/detailweekly.asp?fileid=20071206.@01.  See also 
supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing some of the early prosecutorial 
accomplishments of the KPK). 
214 IAACA, International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities, 
http://www.iaaca.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
215 Desy Nurhayati, UN Conference Aims to Curb Corruption, JAKARTA POST, 
Jan. 18, 2008, http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid 
=20080118.H02.  See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Second Session of 
the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, Second Session, Jan. 28–Feb. 1, 2008, http://www.unodc.org/unodc 
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Legislative action is underway on a number of fronts, each of 
which could help serve as a vehicle for changes in criminal 
procedure, or an impetus for further legislative reform.  Soon after 
Indonesia ratified the UNCAC in April 2006, a drafting committee 
was formed to work on legislation to conform Indonesia to the 
requirements of the Convention, and the committee is currently 
active in advocating such legislation.216  The Constitutional Court 
recently issued a decision ruling that the independent Anti-
Corruption Court was not organized in accordance with 
constitutional principles.  Rather than shut down the Anti-
Corruption Court, however, the Constitutional Court ruled that 
legislators should rectify the problem through new legislation 
within three years, and the pressure is on the legislature to get that 
accomplished.217  A separate committee is now drafting legislation 
in response to that decision, and recent drafts of the proposed 
legislation contemplate a significant expansion of the Anti-
Corruption Court.218  An Indonesian drafting committee is also 
working on a comprehensive revision to the Indonesian Criminal 
Procedure Code.  Drafts of the proposed new legislation include 
provisions which move the country toward a more adversarial-
style system, which would be consistent with some of the needed 
procedural tools described above.219  In addition, the drafting of a 
new substantive and comprehensive criminal code by a committee 
of experts which had been in progress for years has been 
completed and submitted to the legislature.  All four of these draft 
laws involving substantial reforms in the country’s criminal law 
system will soon be the subject of attention by national 
 
/en/treaties/CAC/CAC-COSP-session2.html (conference materials). 
216 U4 Report, supra note 43, at 92–93. 
217  Mulyana Wirakusumah et al. v. Indonesia, Constitutional Court, Decision 
No. 012-016-019/PUU-IV/2006 (Dec. 18, 2006) (Indon.); Harry Bhaskara, Corrupt 
Could Walk Free Without New Law, JAKARTA POST, July 3, 2008, 
http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20080703.H05. 
218 The Formulation Team Reaches an Agreement Towards an Anticorruption Court, 
KOMPAS, Jan. 12, 2008 (unpublished U.S. Embassy translation on file with author); 
Independent Taskforce Drafts New Anticorruption Court Law, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 1, 
2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20071201.H03; 
The House of Representatives Put Priority in Discussing Anticorruption Courts, KORAN 
TEMPO, Dec. 10, 2007 (on file with author); Regional Corruption Courts Proposed, 
JAKARTA POST, Dec. 21, 2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp 
?fileid=20071221.A04; Powerful New Corruption Court Proposed, JAKARTA POST, May 
6, 2008, http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20080506.H04. 
219 Strang, supra note 55. 
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legislators.220  The National Judicial Commission recently 
submitted recommendations to President Yudhoyono on several 
procedural measures intended to improve the efficiency of 
corruption investigations and prosecutions.221  A national law 
commission has been promoting legal reform since it was created 
in 2000.222  The fact that such efforts are already well-underway 
and have broad popular and political support makes it far more 
likely that a legislative proposal to enact procedural reforms 
designed to enhance an anti-corruption efforts will be accepted and 
adopted by host country constituencies.223 
5.1.2. The Breadth of Reform 
In addressing the need for legislative action to enact criminal 
procedure reform in Indonesia and elsewhere, it is crucially 
important to resist the temptation to pursue a narrow fix, 
authorizing the use of new tools and investigative techniques for 
use in corruption cases exclusively by the KPK.  The KPK has 
observed that one of the deficiencies with current Indonesian law 
regarding access to bank records is that different law enforcement 
agencies have been granted different rights, creating confusion and 
inefficiency.224  What is needed is not another patchwork fix, but 
reform focusing on a small set of important criminal code reforms 
that have broad applicability. 
First, new investigative tools and techniques should apply 
 
220 Four Draft Bills to be Submitted to the House of Representatives, MEDIA INDON., 
Feb. 20, 2008 (unpublished U.S. Embassy translation on file with author).  In 
addition, the legislature is already considering a draft law that would significantly 
amend and strengthen the anti-money laundering law.  Law of the Republic of 
Indonesia Concerning the Prevention and Eradication of the Crime Money 
Laundering (unpublished draft law), available at http://www.ppatk.go.id/pdf 
/draft_pp_tppu_english_version.pdf (English version).  
221 National Judicial Commission: Simplify the Long-Winding Handling of 
Corruption, KOMPAS, Nov. 7, 2007 (unpublished U.S. Embassy translation on file 
with author). 
222 NATIONAL L. COMM’N OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDON., LAW REFORM POLICIES 
(RECOMMENDATIONS) (2003) (outlining a strategy of national legal reform). 
223 Jacques DeLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American 
Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECO. L. 179, 289 (1999) (noting that “U.S. legal models are more likely to be 
emulated and U.S. providers’ legal advice is more likely to be followed when the 
substance of the U.S. prescriptions or American templates is relatively compatible 
with the recipient nation’s preexisting system or its agenda for legal reform.”). 
224 DAVIDSEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 39. 
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beyond obvious corruption crimes.  Although the prompt for 
legislative change is the need to enable law enforcement to 
investigate public corruption effectively, corruption is very often a 
symptom or cause of other criminal activity, such as tax evasion, 
customs violations, bank fraud, prostitution, money laundering, 
and (in Indonesia particularly) illegal logging.225  Even if not 
apparent at the outset of an investigation, these links between 
criminal activity often lead investigators in corruption cases to 
evidence of other crimes, and vice versa.  Leads in corruption 
investigations and new witnesses and testimony can arise out of 
the investigation of these and other substantive crimes.  On a 
strategic level, part of an effective anti-corruption strategy involves 
taking steps to eradicate criminal activity that spawns corruption.  
Tactically, such crimes should be investigated and prosecuted 
together.  Cases involving, for example, illegal smuggling and 
corrupt payments to customs officials are more effectively 
prosecuted when criminal charges relating to the full panoply of 
conduct can be brought against defendants in a single case.  In any 
event, the same procedures that can be used effectively to pierce 
and dismantle networks of corruption can be equally effective 
against other types of complex or organized crime that plague 
Indonesia.226 
Second, new legislation should not exclusively enable the KPK.  
Although in Indonesia and in other developing countries, forming 
and equipping an independent agency may be an appropriate 
solution to the problem of corruption within the existing law 
enforcement institutions, it cannot replace them, either 
geographically or jurisdictionally.  The KPK, currently based in 
Jakarta, has limited reach and limited investigative and 
prosecutorial resources.227  Only the national police and the AGO 
 
225 Peter Gelling, Forest Loss in Sumatra Becomes a Global Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
6, 2007, at A14. (“‘There are a number of ongoing investigations into corruption 
that has allowed illegal loggers from all over Indonesia to go free,’ said Thomson 
Siagian, a spokesman for the attorney general.”); Down in the Woods, ECONOMIST, 
May 23, 2006, at 73. 
226 Ohr, supra note 116, at 47–50, 53–57. 
227 As noted above, see supra note 107 and accompanying text, the KPK has 
fewer than 100 investigators and prosecutors, all stationed in Jakarta, while the 
Attorney General’s Office has at least 5600 prosecutors distributed across the 
sprawling archipelago.  The AGO can prosecute all types of corruption and 
related crimes, while the KPK, by charter, is specifically restricted to cases 
involving significant state losses, or law enforcement or other high government 
officials, or cases which have otherwise achieved widespread notoriety.  Law 
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are represented all across the country and can attack corruption 
and related crimes on multiple levels, and only general criminal 
code reform that enables those institutions to function effectively 
will have broad and lasting effect in sustaining corruption reform. 
5.1.3. Issues of Legal Culture and History 
Proposed procedural reforms for Indonesia or any country, of 
course, must take account of that country’s legal culture and 
history, which affects expectations and attitudes toward law 
enforcement.  Because new procedural provisions must fit within 
the larger context of the country’s criminal procedure, care must be 
taken to ensure that new measures do not disturb or conflict with 
extant procedures, justice sector institutional structures, and the 
norms under which actors in the criminal justice system operate.  
Failure to integrate new measures effectively in a manner which is 
“user-friendly” to the relevant actors could condemn them to 
practical irrelevance, even if legislatively successful. 
To a much greater extent than substantive criminal laws, 
criminal procedures are a product of a particular country’s overall 
legal system and legal culture.  Some of the measures we propose 
were developed in the context of the Anglo-American 
“adversarial” legal tradition, in which the roles of prosecutors, 
judges, and defense attorneys are viewed very differently than in 
“inquisitorial” civil law traditions like the Dutch system that 
provided the foundation for Indonesia’s criminal procedure 
code.228  Nevertheless, over the last 20 years, civil law countries in 
many parts of the world have initiated reforms which incorporate 
features drawn from the American “adversarial” system.229  
Indonesia is itself in the process of reforming its criminal 
 
Number 30 of 2002 on the Commission for the Eradication of Criminal Acts of 
Corruption, art. 11 (Indon.). The new anti-corruption law may address this issue 
in part.  The current draft would expand the KPK, including the establishment of 
regional offices. 
228 See Langer, supra note 99, at 35–38 (discussing how American plea 
bargaining assumes an adversarial conception of the players in the criminal 
process which is not easily transmitted to civil countries which embrace the 
inquisitorial model); see also Cousino, supra note 207, at 331–60 (discussing 
changing roles of Chilean prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges in the 
context of legal reform from an inquisitorial system to a more adversarial system). 
229 Langer, supra note 99, at 1–3, 26–28.  As Langer observes, this process of 
exporting legal concepts has led to a debate over the extent to which various legal 
systems have become “Americanized.”  Id. at 1–3. 
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procedure code, and is considering adopting some procedures that 
parallel those found in more “adversarial” systems.230  The 
provisions we propose require adjustments, but not a wholesale 
transformation of the legal system, and so can be tailored to assist 
law enforcement in operating within both common law and civil 
law traditions.  Moreover, although our recommendations are 
informed by the U.S. experience, our legislative agenda is based 
not on U.S. law, but on the UNCAC, which offers a more universal 
template.231 
Several considerations apply to Indonesia more specifically.  
Indonesia’s history of authoritarianism and corruption among 
police and prosecutors has reinforced the view that they should 
have a limited ability to act unilaterally.  This factor must be 
considered when framing new procedures based on the U.S. 
experience, where prosecutors have much greater freedom of 
action.  A second, more recent feature of Indonesian legal culture, 
which must be acknowledged in the process for reform, is the post-
Suharto emphasis on “transparency.”  Criminal investigations 
generally are most effective when conducted out of the public eye, 
and public corruption investigations in particular require secrecy 
to succeed.  But new criminal procedures will be acceptable in 
Indonesia only if there is sufficient oversight and accountability on 
their use.  In addition, since there is no Fourth Amendment or 
other similar constitutional checks on law enforcement action, and 
no exclusionary rule to motivate law enforcement to give due 
attention to such rights, rules which protect the rights of suspects 
and defendants must be built into legislation authorizing new 
procedures. 
5.2. A Concise Legislative Package of Law Enforcement-Enabling 
Reforms 
A handful of legislative reforms which enable Indonesian law 
enforcement agencies to deploy strategies and techniques which 
have proven effective elsewhere, and which are endorsed by the 
UNCAC, could have a tremendous impact on the effectiveness of 
law enforcement over the medium term.  While the 
 
230 Strang, supra note 55. 
231 Commentators have observed that legal concepts based on international 
norms are more readily accepted than “transplants” based on country-specific 
models.  DeLisle, supra note 223, at 269; Catherine Walsh, The “law” in Law and 
Development, LAW IN TRANSITION, Autumn 2000, at 7, 12. 
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recommendations set forth below are tailored to Indonesia, 
because the legal provisions suggested address universal obstacles 
to effective anti-corruption enforcement, they should be applicable 
in many countries in the developing world. 
5.2.1. Whistleblower Protection 
A separate whistleblower protection law is needed to 
encourage reporting to law enforcement by those who observe 
crimes in government offices—procurement kickbacks, 
embezzlements, illegal “fees” on the public, excessive “gifts” to 
official decision-makers, and other practices which are staples of 
entrenched corruption—and to protect those employees after the 
fact of the reporting becomes known.  A typical law has several 
components:  a definition of whistle blowing, including what sort 
of conduct is reported and to whom the reports are made, a 
definition for the types of workplace retaliation which are 
prohibited once a person has qualified as a whistle blower, and a 
process for sanctioning the retaliator and/or restoring the 
workplace benefits of the aggrieved whistle blower.  An effective 
law, needed in Indonesia and many other developing countries, 
should focus on encouraging witnesses to expose corrupt criminal 
acts undertaken by public officials, and so it must provide for the 
initial confidentiality of the whistle blower’s identity, and require 
that she cooperate with law enforcement in subsequent 
investigation of the reported conduct. 
The typical remedy provided for in most U.S. whistleblower 
laws—the ability to sue—is not likely to be viewed as a serious 
means of protection in Indonesia or in many other developing 
countries.  With a limited bar of qualified civil attorneys, 
widespread corruption in the judiciary, and the inefficiencies of 
civil litigation, the courtroom is not viewed as the forum in which a 
civil servant can take on her superiors and other powerful figures.  
Instead, the police and prosecutors (including the KPK in 
Indonesia) should be authorized to investigate any potentially 
retaliatory action taken against a whistleblower, and to 
recommend to the Minister and/or President that a range of 
sanctions be imposed on the public officials responsible for the 
retaliation.  In more severe cases which amount to witness 
intimidation, the police and prosecutors should be empowered to 
investigate and prosecute, seeking restitution for the victim in 
addition to a prison sentence for the offender. 
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5.2.2. Undercover Authorization 
Criminal procedure codes must be revised to ensure that they 
contain no ambiguity as to both the legality of undercover 
operations and the admissibility at trial of evidence acquired in 
that manner.  In Indonesia, this means that a new law, or an 
amendment to the criminal procedure code, should authorize the 
National Police, the KPK, and other law enforcement agencies with 
investigatory power such as the Special Crimes division of the 
AGO, to undertake undercover operations.  These operations 
should be defined to include the use of informants, cooperating 
citizens or undercover officers to record contacts with criminal 
suspects.  Such contacts should be defined to include telephone or 
in-person meetings, controlled deliveries, and other monitored 
transactions.232 
In order to ensure that such special techniques are not abused, 
the relevant law enforcement agency should be required to 
establish predication before initiating an undercover operation 
against a target.  That is, it should be required to document a 
legitimate pre-existing basis to suspect criminal activity by the 
target arising from other investigative leads, such as reliable 
reports by citizens, a whistleblower’s report, observations by law 
enforcement, previous proven similar criminal activity by the 
target, or analysis of relevant records.  Each undercover operation 
should be required to be authorized in writing by a senior law 
enforcement official, such as the chief of a provincial police unit or 
prosecutor’s office, or by a designated unit at the investigatory 
authority’s headquarters, which in Indonesia means the National 
Police headquarters or the AGO in Jakarta.  Such records should be 
required to be maintained and provided to the defense attorney 
and trial judge in the event that charges are subsequently brought 
against the target.  They should also be required to be available for 
inspection by appropriate government inspectors or auditors after 
the conclusion of the investigation. 
In order to prevent entrapment of an innocent person, the 
statute should require that law enforcement officers participating 
in undercover operations, or informants or cooperators 
participating at their direction, cannot repeatedly target the same 
 
232 Such measures are consistent with the UNCAC’s requirement that parties 
take measures to allow such special investigative techniques consistent with the 
basic principles of its domestic law.  UNCAC, supra note 28, art. 50. 
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person in successive operations, and cannot attempt to overcome 
the will of the target by excessive inducement.  All recorded 
contacts with the target should be required to be preserved and 
made available to the defense attorney and trial judge in order to 
allow the defendant to evaluate an entrapment defense, and to 
ensure transparency and accountability in the use of undercover 
techniques. 
Undercover evidence is only useful if admissible as evidence at 
trial.  The undercover law should expressly permit the use of 
undercover evidence as a legal form of evidence to support a 
criminal conviction.  Such evidence could be admitted in the form 
of audiotapes or videotapes of undercover contacts with the 
defendant, or of surveillance of the defendant’s activities, or law 
enforcement testimony regarding the same.  In order to ensure 
compliance with the above-described rules, however, the trial 
judge should be required to rule on the admissibility of the 
evidence after reviewing the documentation concerning 
predication and authorization of the undercover operation, and the 
substance of the evidence itself.  Evidence that was fairly collected 
in accordance with the rules would be admitted; evidence that was 
not would be excluded. 
5.2.3. Authorizing Access to Financial Records 
Law enforcement agencies should be authorized to request 
account and other documentation from banks where the request is 
related to a legitimate, ongoing criminal investigation.  Such a 
provision should expressly provide that bank secrecy laws must 
give way to legitimate requests from law enforcement.  In 
Indonesia, this provision would be a broader version of the 
provision that currently appears in its money laundering law.233  
Moreover, the scope of persons whose financial documents may be 
requested must be broadened to include not only targets and 
defendants but any associate, relative, or business connected to 
such person or to the criminal activity under investigation or 
indictment. 
Consistent with Indonesia’s 1999 anti-corruption law, requests 
for financial documentation to a bank or other financial institution 
should be authorized through a written request from an 
 
233 Law Number 15 of 2002 Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering, as 
amended by Law Number 25 of 2003, art. 32(2) (Indon.). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
260 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:1 
 
authorized supervising investigator, prosecutor or trial judge.234  
The authorization letter should certify that the request is part of a 
legitimate ongoing investigation or prosecution, and copies of the 
letters should be maintained and available for inspection by 
auditors to ensure that the authority is not used for indiscriminate 
snooping.  One possible oversight mechanism would be an annual 
report to the legislature on how many financial requests were 
made by investigators from each relevant agency. 
To be most effective, production of financial records, so long as 
the above safe-guards are observed, should occur without an 
intermediary.  In Indonesia this means that rather than be routed 
through the Bank of Indonesia, such requests for records should be 
sent directly to the financial institution at issue, which should be 
required to respond and provide information within a reasonable 
period.  A failure to comply with a reasonable request for records 
under the statute should be referred to a central authority—in 
Indonesia, the Bank of Indonesia—for the imposition of 
administrative and monetary sanctions on the institution.  
Repeated failures should lead to escalating sanctions including, in 
Indonesia, potential loss of the institution’s status as an authorized 
financial institution. 
5.2.4. Creating Immunity and Cooperation Mechanisms 
Of the measures proposed, immunity agreements and a 
mechanism to induce cooperation through sentence mitigation are 
likely to be the most difficult to reconcile to the existing legal 
systems in civil law countries such as Indonesia.  In the United 
States, the use of such mechanisms is often intertwined with 
negotiations over guilty pleas as part of the plea bargaining 
system.  In civil law countries, including Indonesia, neither guilty 
pleas nor plea bargaining exists.235  Still, as noted above, some civil 
law countries have adopted measures that, although different in 
practice from their U.S. counterparts, appear intended to generally 
achieve the same objectives.236  Thus, the law enforcement-
enhancing benefits of immunity and sentence reduction 
 
234 Law Number 31 of 1999 on Eradication of Corruption Offences, art. 29(1) 
(Indon.). 
235 The draft revisions to the Criminal Procedure Code would introduce the 
concept of the guilty plea and limited plea bargaining for certain less serious 
crimes.  Strang, supra note 55. 
236 See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text. 
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mechanisms, if the provisions are properly tailored to address 
particulars of the existing legal system, can be transplanted. 
Specifically in Indonesia, a system for granting immunity for 
fewer witnesses in a case has been proposed as part of the draft 
revisions of its criminal procedure code.  Under this proposal, the 
prosecution could be dismissed against a lesser defendant in a case 
who agrees to become a prosecution witness and testify against 
other more culpable defendants.237  Such a provision would go far 
towards implementing a cooperating witness mechanism in the 
Indonesian system. 
In Indonesia as well, an alternative or additional provision 
could be built on the basis of the authority that has already been 
discussed within the AGO—the Attorney General’s authority to 
terminate a case in the “interests of justice.”238  Such authority 
presumes the pendency of a prosecution, and only provides an 
avenue for relief from conviction, not from prosecution.  Like the 
proposed revision to the criminal procedure code discussed above, 
it would thus differ from a U.S.-style grant of immunity, which is 
typically issued prior to indictment.239  While this would make 
scenarios in which an immunized person goes undercover less 
likely, it would still provide a powerful incentive for corrupt 
parties to turn on their co-conspirators and assist investigators in 
locating critical evidence. 
Enabling legislation based on the Attorney General’s authority 
should define “interests of justice” to include a defendant’s 
conduct in providing substantial assistance to the government in 
the investigation and prosecution of others, together with a 
confession of his own criminal conduct and the location and 
repatriation of any ill-gotten gains or other restitution for harm 
done, such that the public’s interest in the defendant’s cooperation 
would outweigh its interest in his prosecution.  These general 
requirements should apply to provisions enabling immunity 
grants in others countries as well.  Importantly, the cooperation the 
defendant provides should not be allowed to constitute merely the 
 
237 Strang, supra note 55. 
238 Law Number 16 of 2004 on the Prosecution Service of the Republic of 
Indonesia, art. 35(c). 
239 In any event, public suspicions about possible corrupt decision making by 
prosecutors and the lack of transparency in pre-indictment immunity negotiations 
would likely make a U.S.-style immunity system untenable in Indonesia at this 
juncture. 
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repayment of embezzled assets or other restitution, since that 
would allow wealthy defendants to buy their way out of a 
conviction.  In Indonesia, legislation could define “interests of 
justice” to mean specific cooperative measures that law 
enforcement determines is of assistance in developing prosecutions 
against other criminally culpable persons, or a set of factors which 
the Attorney General must consider in exercising his authority. 
The authority to grant immunity (or, more accurately, the 
authority to terminate a case), under either proposed provision 
should be discretionary with the prosecution, and not an 
entitlement or right of the defendant.  Each case will be different.  
Some defendants may be reluctant to fully cooperate, and law 
enforcement must control the ultimate benefit if it is to be an 
effective inducement for defendants to come forward with 
meaningful information and evidence. 
Provisions authorizing grants of immunity should also address 
the demand for transparency by the Indonesian public and likely 
by other developing country populations.  If criminal charges are 
dismissed against a defendant who agrees to testify at trial against 
his co-defendants, the public’s need for transparency in the 
dismissal decision would likely be satisfied by the witness’s 
testimony itself and the announcement of the prosecutor that the 
dismissal of charges against him was in accordance with the 
provision allowing a lesser defendant to testify against more 
significant defendants.  Under either that provision or an exercise 
of the prosecuting authority’s immunity authority, where dismissal 
is before trial, the prosecutor should be required to report to the 
court in each case, presumably at the conclusion of proceedings, in 
the form of a document that publicly discloses the scope, nature, 
and reliability of the cooperation provided by the defendant, and 
any other assistance, such as the return of secreted assets, relevant 
to the dismissal determination.  Such a requirement would 
respond to the public need for transparency in such decisions, and 
would maintain pressure on prosecutors to ensure that the 
mechanism is not misused.  The practice would be much more 
acceptable to the public, the media, civil society, and other 
observers if it were genuinely used to turn smaller players against 
more prominent ones than if it were perceived as an escape valve 
for powerful defendants. 
Since there is no formal charge bargaining in the Indonesian 
system and most civil law systems, a separate cooperation 
mechanism would be limited to an avenue for sentence mitigation 
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under certain circumstances.  In Indonesia, this mechanism would 
be a logical extension of the concept introduced in the new witness 
protection law, in which judges are allowed to consider a 
defendant’s testimony in mitigation of his sentence.240  The draft 
revisions to the criminal procedure code contain such a proposed 
procedure, under which a defendant may have his sentence 
reduced if he pleads guilty (if allowed under the proposed revised 
procedures), and helps disclose the role of more culpable 
suspects.241  The new provision, if adopted, should expand the 
notion of cooperation to include pre-trial cooperation by a 
defendant.  In order to render the provision a useful investigative 
weapon for prosecutors, the new law should specifically vest 
prosecutors with the authority to ask for a reduced sentence 
(perhaps to as low as half of the otherwise authorized sentence) if 
the defendant provides substantial cooperation.  Again, 
“substantial cooperation” should be defined in the law, and the 
prosecutor’s sentence reduction request should be done in the form 
of a written request, available to the public, which documents the 
defendant’s satisfaction of that standard. 
In the case of either dismissal of charges or a reduction in 
sentence for a cooperating defendant, there should be 
requirements for approval at the highest levels.  In Indonesia, a 
dismissal under the Attorney General’s authority pursuant to the 
2004 prosecution law would likely have to be approved by the 
Attorney General himself or a senior assistant.  Dismissal under 
the proposed new criminal procedure provision, or a request for a 
mitigation of sentence, should be required to be approved at least 
by the chief prosecutor in the province.  Other measures intended 
to reassure the public as to the integrity of the process, and to 
provide maximum oversight and transparency, may also be 
required. 
5.2.5. Authorizing the Integrated Use of Other Criminal Statutes 
As noted above, Indonesia has enacted a comprehensive set of 
provisions criminalizing money laundering activities, an essential 
support to corruption crime investigations.  Amendments to the 
law intended to strengthen the country’s anti-money laundering 
 
240 Law Number 13 of 2006 on Protection of Witness and Victim, art. 10(2) 
(Indon.). 
241 Strang, supra note 55. 
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regime have already been proposed by the government.  Indonesia 
also has some obstruction of justice laws, although a law 
prohibiting witness bribery or intimidation is needed. 242 
Legislation is also needed which would allow prosecutors 
handling public corruption matters to charge these and any other 
criminal acts discovered in the course of a public corruption 
investigation.  Thus KPK prosecutors should be authorized to 
charge public corruption targets or their associates with other 
crimes, and the Anti-Corruption Court should be authorized to 
hear cases which include such charges.  Similarly, prosecutors with 
the AGO should be authorized to bring charges designated as 
Special Crimes and those designated as General Crimes together in 
the same case, using the investigative authority of the Special 
Crimes Division as necessary in such matters. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Many have addressed the comprehensive measures of reform 
appropriate to effectively meet the problem of entrenched 
corruption in Indonesia and elsewhere.  We address but one 
component—enforcement, and within that focus, just one slice—
criminal procedure reforms necessary to enable law enforcement to 
effectively investigate and prosecute corruption crimes.  We are 
under no illusion that the criminal reforms advocated here are the 
panacea for the deeply entrenched corruption problem in 
Indonesia.  Even if enacted, it would take time for investigators 
and prosecutors to become familiar with these new tools and to 
determine how best to incorporate them into their investigative 
and prosecutive strategies.  Moreover, legislative reform by itself 
will have little impact without continued reform and capacity-
 
242 Indonesian law enforcement agencies also should be given express 
authorization to take short-term measures to protect witnesses.  Such a provision 
would be a logical extension of the new witness protection law, which creates an 
independent agency that administers a formal witness protection program.  Law 
Number 13 of 2006 on Protection of Witness and Victim, arts. 1–22 (Indon.).  
While the existence of such a program is a positive step, it contemplates the 
admission of witnesses on the basis of formal applications, a cumbersome and 
expensive process applicable only in cases where long term protection is needed. 
Id. arts. 28–36.  What is needed more commonly in public corruption cases is 
temporary protection—compensating a witness for staying away from home for a 
few weeks, moving a witness and her family to a secure location for a brief period, 
obtaining alternative identity documents for a witness, or taking extra protective 
measures during or just before trial. In civil law countries such as Indonesia, such 
activities must be explicitly authorized by law. 
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building within the law enforcement agencies at issue.  But the 
limited set of procedural reforms we suggest is notable, we believe, 
specifically because it is compact and consists of measures of 
proven effectiveness which are endorsed by the UNCAC, to which 
Indonesia and many other countries are party.  When understood 
and implemented together, as part of a comprehensive reform of 
the structure for investigating and prosecuting public corruption, 
these reforms have the powder keg potential to substantially boost 
the law enforcement component of corruption eradication in 
Indonesia and other developing countries. 
Economists, diplomats, and other experts frequently wonder 
why investigators and prosecutors are not more effective in 
catching and convicting corrupt officials in many developing 
nations.  While there are certainly many answers to this question, 
one obvious one is that investigators and prosecutors often do not 
have the authority to engage in the sort of tactics needed to tackle 
the unique challenges posed by complex public corruption cases.  
No amount of political support, increased resources, or foreign 
advice can make up for inadequate provisions in the domestic 
criminal procedure code authorizing law enforcement activities.  
The UNCAC articulates the aspiration of effective anti-corruption 
law enforcement in developing countries.  We offer a legislative 
agenda to make it a reality. 
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